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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE STRATEGIC SELECTION OF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS

By

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This dissertation is dedicated to my late mother, Elizabeth Ausderan.

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I examine the selection of foreign policy advisors as part of a strategic decision-making process by the political leader. Among other things, I find that the hawkish foreign policy preferences of a state's political leadership (comprised of the political leader, foreign minister, and defense minister) have a negative effect on the likelihood that that state is targeted, and that inexperienced leaders are more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences. I also find that, all else being equal, leaders tend to select foreign and defense ministers with similar foreign policy preferences in order to maximize the probability with which they achieve their preferred policies. These findings were generated using original data on the personal characteristics of the foreign and defense ministers of 164 countries between 1950 and 2000. I also ran an original, web-based experiment in the U.S. and India that provided additional support for the theoretical arguments leading to my hypotheses.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> Because of the way this government must be run ... I have to be guided largely by the opinions of those that I trust day in and day out.
>
> – President Dwight Eisenhower (1954).

What do leaders look for in potential foreign policy advisors? Although leaders exercise significant control over the selection of their own foreign policy advisors, extant research on the influence of advisors has not yet examined the leader-advisor relationship as a dynamic one. For example, Flores (2009) shows that the survival of foreign ministers is dependent upon the survival of political leaders, but does not address whether leaders purposefully select foreign ministers who can help prolong the leader's survival. Redd (2002) uses experimental methods to show that people are influenced by foreign policy advisors, but does not address whether an advisor's influence affects the probability that they become an advisor in the first place. Koch and Fulton (2011) show that states with female foreign and defense ministers exhibit increased conflict behavior, but do not address whether political leaders take those increases into account when they select their foreign and defense ministers. What these analyses all have in common is that they view the leader-advisor relationship as something that does not involve a decision by one actor to appoint the other actor to their position. This is analogous to examining an international conflict without taking into account how

the conflict began. I posit that leaders are not simply influenced by their foreign policy advisors. The leader's selection of foreign policy advisors will itself be influenced by the knowledge that leaders are influenced by their advisors, and that other states will observe who is influencing the leader and will adjust their behavior accordingly. This dissertation seeks to provide an explanation of that process.

Because the extent to which foreign policy advisors have a measurable impact upon leaders' decision-making and policy outcomes should affect the amount of time and energy that leaders devote to the advisor selection process, my secondary research question is: To what extent do foreign policy advisors actually matter? Koch and Fulton (2011) notwithstanding, few studies have systematically examined whether variation in foreign policy advisors (or even advisory structures) has a significant impact upon leaders' decision-making. This is despite a sizable number of studies that have applied large-N quantitative methods to the study of political leaders' personal characteristics and how variation in those characteristics affects state-level outcomes in international conflict, including leaders' tenure (Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Potter 2007), age (Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005), military service (Horowitz and Stam 2010), and education (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011), among others. Therefore, another goal of this dissertation is to produce evidence of a more systematic relationship between the personal characteristics of foreign policy advisors and state-level outcomes in international conflict. I aim to show that the utilization of large data sets on individual actors other than the political leader has the potential to vastly increase our understanding of conflict processes and foreign policy.

Just as extant research on the influence of foreign policy advisors has not yet considered how that influence should affect the advisor selection process, extant research on the advisor selection process has tended to ignore whether or not a leader's selection of advisors has any measurable impact upon leaders' decision-making or foreign policy outcomes. For example, George (1972) compares a wide variety of organizational devices and structures that have

been used in foreign policy decision-making by past U.S. presidents (including the "multiple advocacy system" and Nixon's National Security Council), but does not examine how those structures affected the ability of U.S. presidents to attain their preferred policies, only how they contributed to the president's ability to make rational decisions. Hermann and Preston (1994) determine that the two primary ways in which to classify a president's advisory structure are 1) whether the president works best when the chain of command over foreign policy is formal or informal, and 2) whether the president focuses more on the *process* of policy-making (that is, on seeking consensus or avoiding conflict) or on the *problems* of policy-making (that is, on the accomplishing of specific tasks). Again, however, the authors do not consider whether a president's advisory structure has any significant impact upon U.S. foreign policy (Hermann and Preston 1994).

In sum, this dissertation is concerned with two questions that have each been examined in some capacity by existing literature, but usually in isolation of the other question (What do leaders look for in potential foreign policy advisors? And to what extent do advisors actually matter?). Furthermore, existing literature on both the influence of advisors and the advisor selection process has avoided utilizing the same large-N quantitative methods that have been applied to the study of political leaders, presumably because most scholars assume that advisors do not matter to the extent that empirical analyses utilizing large data sets on their personal characteristics can tell us anything significant about conflict processes or foreign policy.

The general approach that I take throughout the dissertation (in particular chapters 2 and 3) is to discuss how a leader's personal characteristics affect their goals regarding international conflict (for example, do leaders with certain characteristics have more of an incentive to avoid conflicts? To escalate conflicts? Etc.). Then I discuss how the selection of foreign policy advisors could help a leader accomplish each of those goals regarding international conflict (for example, which personal characteristics could leaders select in potential advisors

to help themselves avoid conflicts?). Finally, I discuss how a leader's personal characteristics should affect the personal characteristics that they select in their advisors.

In chapter 2, I argue that the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the political leader, foreign minister, and defense minister have a negative effect on the likelihood that their state is targeted in an international crisis, but that this relationship should weaken as the executive constraints in that state increase. Furthermore, I argue that inexperienced leaders – being more likely to be targeted in the absence of hawkish advisors – should be more likely to appoint foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences in order to decrease the probability that their state is targeted, but that this relationship should weaken as the leader's own hawkish preferences increase and the leader cares less about being targeted. Probit and ordered probit analyses of original data on the personal characteristics of the foreign and defense ministers in 164 countries between 1950 and 2000 provide support for these hypotheses.

In chapter 3, I argue that the delegation of foreign policy decisions to the foreign and defense ministers constitutes a principal-agent problem that leaders will account for during the selection of those ministers. More specifically, I argue that leaders with hawkish foreign policy preferences will tend to select foreign and defense ministers with similarly hawkish foreign policy preferences, and that this effect should weaken whenever the leader does not have as much control over the selection of those ministers, in particular when the leader is the head of a coalition government in which the foreign affairs and defense portfolios have been awarded to a different political party. I test these hypotheses using ordered probit analyses of the European Representative Democracy (ERD) data set on cabinet formation in post-WWII Europe, as well as original data on the personal charactistics of the foreign and defense ministers in 29 countries between 1950 and 2000. I find moderate to strong support for the hypotheses.

In chapter 4, I describe an original, web-based experiment that I conducted in both the

U.S. and India on risk acceptance, perceptions of threat, and the delegation of foreign policy decisions. The results of the experiment provide more direct evidence of some of the causal mechanisms described throughout the previous two chapters. For example, the results show that individuals who are thrust into a hypothetical leadership position and who believe that their country is more likely to be targeted by other states prefer to surround themselves with people who appear aggressive, and that more aggressive individuals – when forced to delegate decisions concerning international conflict to another individual – prefer to delegate those decisions to more aggressive individuals.

This dissertation should appeal to a wide variety of political scientists, including scholars of international relations, comparative politics, and american politics. International relations scholars should be drawn to my focus on foreign policy decision-making and my hypotheses on conflict initiation. Comparative politics scholars should be interested in the theoretical discussions on and empirical analyses of the selection of foreign policy advisors as it pertains to the cabinet formation process, particularly in chapter 3 when I show that the ability of the political leader to use the selection of foreign and defense ministers to ensure that their preferred policies are carried out is diminished whenever the leader is the head of a coalition government in which the foreign affairs and defense portfolios have been awarded to a different political party. Finally, a large portion of the literature on leadership styles and advisory structures that I draw upon throughout chapters 2 and 3 focuses on U.S. presidents. Moreover, I tie in the most recent selections of U.S. Secretary of State and Defense (as of this writing) as often as I can throughout chapters 2 and 3 in order to illustrate how those selections can be explained by the theoretical arguments.

CHAPTER 2

SIGNALING AGGRESSION

> This is Condoleezza Rice ... She tells me everything I know about the Soviet Union.
>
> – President George H.W. Bush to
> Mikhail Gorbachev, December 1989.

2.1 Introduction

Hours before his inauguration as President of Ecuador, Jamil Mahuad was informed by the military command that a Peruvian invasion within hours of his inauguration was a likely scenario. Mahuad recounted that day in his autobiography while discussing cabinet formation:

> General Jose Gallardo had been minister of defense during the most recent armed conflict in 1995; that conflict had ended with an Ecuadorian military victory. I appointed General Gallardo to be minister of defense ... This was done to send a clear signal: Although Ecuador was openly inclined to a peaceful solution, we were ready to defend ourselves fiercely if necessary (Mahuad 2005, 189).

I suspect that the appointment of General Gallardo as Minister of Defense by the President of Ecuador, Jamil Mahuad, is representative of a larger trend, and that the selection of

foreign policy advisors is part of a strategic decision-making process by the political leader.[1] In this chapter, I propose the first part of an explanation of that process.

Extant research on the importance of foreign policy advisors has tended to ignore the possibility that an advisor's influence informs the advisor selection process, that leaders purposefully select advisors with certain characteristics or who will exercise certain types of influence. To give a few examples that I did not use in the introduction, Redd (2005) examines President Clinton's press conferences and speeches to show that Clinton was strongly influenced by his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, with regards to his policy on Kosovo, but Redd (2005) does not consider whether Albright was chosen specifically because of her knowledge about the region in question, or because she would project the sort of image that President Clinton wanted to project with his foreign policy team (and political cabinet more generally). Garrison (2001) argues that strategic issue framing by President Carter's closest advisors, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, strongly influenced Carter's decision-making in regards to the SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union and is representative of the "independent influence that advisors can have on the decision process" (Garrison 2001, 776), but does not address whether President Carter specifically selected a Secretary of State with certain views and/or characteristics. Stern (2004) contrasts the literature on the poli-heuristic theory of decision-making with several other theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy, including problem representation, cognitive institutionalism, and decision units. But the author's focus is on the determinants of foreign policy, not on the process by which the political leaders selects his/her foreign policy advisors.

In this chapter, I argue that the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the political leader, foreign minister, and defense minister have a negative effect on the probability that their state is targeted in an international crisis, but that this relationship should weaken as the executive constraints in that state increase and the political leadership has less control over foreign

[1] In chapter 5, I examine the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru in more detail.

policy decision-making. Furthermore, I argue that inexperienced leaders – being more likely to be targeted – should be more likely to appoint foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences, but that this relationship should weaken as the leader's own hawkish foreign policy preferences increase and the leader cares less about being targeted. Using probit and ordered probit analyses of original data on the personal characteristics of the foreign and defense ministers in 164 countries between 1950 and 2000, I find support for these predictions. More generally, the results indicate that large-N empirical analyses of individual actors other than the political leader – sub-leader individual actors (SLIAs) – do have the potential to increase our understanding of conflict processes and foreign policy.

2.2 Strategic Selection

I focus on the goals of the political leader, concentrating in particular on how the personal characteristics of the political leader affect their policy preferences, how the personal characteristics of foreign policy advisors (FPAs) affect policy outcomes, and, finally, how the personal characteristics of the political leader should influence the characteristics that they select in their FPAs.[2] Moreover, I consider these relationships through the lens of international conflict, focusing on the impact that FPAs have upon state-level outcomes in international conflict, and the impact that state-level outcomes in international conflict (and the domestic political consequences of those outcomes) have upon the leader's selection of FPAs.

In an experimental study, Redd (2002, 355) found that survey respondents were unlikely to prefer foreign policy actions that were evaluated negatively by one or more advisors,

[2]In a recent study of political leaders, Chiozza and Goemans (2011, 7) do not "evaluate how specific personal characteristics of leaders, from their cognitive styles to their educational and military backgrounds, affect their decisions about war and peace." But specific personal characteristics are an appropriate focus when examining the interactions between multiple individual actors – say, leaders and FPAs – as opposed to the decisions that a single individual actor makes regarding international conflict.

regardless of the overall expected utility of those actions. This is primarily because it suggests that individuals are indeed influenced by foreign policy advisors. But Redd (2002) also found that survey respondents were highly responsive to the political ramifications of their decisions, reflecting the common assumption in international relations research that a leader's primary goal is to remain in power. If we assume that leaders have at least some control over the selection of their foreign policy advisors, then we can make our first testable predictions regarding the personal characteristics of foreign policy advisors if we can figure out 1) how the personal characteristics of foreign policy advisors affect policy outcomes, and 2) whether those policy outcomes affect the likelihood that the leader can remain in power.

So what events and/or policy outcomes affect the likelihood that the leader can remain in power?[3] Leaders need to distribute resources in order to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2004). If we assume that leaders tend to distribute resources in whatever manner maximizes the likelihood that they can remain in power, then being targeted unexpectedly by other countries causes the leader to deviate from that optimal distribution of resources by forcing them to expend resources that they would not otherwise have used to respond to challenges, ultimately lowering the likelihood that they can remain in power. Although it is possible for a leader to benefit from the initiation of international conflicts, especially when a severe domestic shock has occurred (Downs and Rocke 1994; Chiozza and Goemans 2011), all else being equal, I expect that most leaders will prolong their survival by decreasing the probability that they are targeted by other countries.[4]

Gelpi and Grieco (2001) argue that inexperienced leaders face additional domestic political pressure to avoid costly conflicts, making them less willing to use force and more willing

[3]There are many events that affect a leader's survival, and many characteristics of potential foreign policy advisors that could affect the occurrence of those events. Therefore, there are many ways to approach answering this question.

[4]Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argue that leaders occasionally seek international conflicts in order to protect themselves from punishment – not only to protect their hold on power but to avoid meeting a grim fate after losing power.



Figure 2.1: Individual Actors and International Conflict

to make concessions during negotiations, therefore decreasing the expected cost of targeting that leader and increasing the probability that they are targeted by other countries.[5] The authors acknowledge that inexperienced leaders will occasionally benefit from successfully resisting an international crisis (in both democracies and autocracies), but that the net utility of resistance "entails the possibility of both costs and benefits for democratic leaders," which are particularly consequential for inexperienced leaders who have not yet established a strong reputation for competence among their own people (Gelpi and Grieco 2001, 798). For example, U.S. President George H.W. Bush achieved sky-high approval ratings following a decisive victory against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991, but lost his bid for reelection the following year when the economy became the more salient issue.

Leaders cannot modify their own inexperience in order to avoid being targeted. They must simply wait for time to pass. But since the leader has some control over the selection of their foreign policy advisors (FPAs), they could potentially use the selection of FPAs to help themselves avoid external challenges. The question becomes: what could the leader select in their FPAs that would decrease the likelihood of being targeted? To answer that question, I turn to other research on the personal characteristics of political leaders.

Recent research has shown that political leaders prefer less conciliatory foreign policies as they grow older, have served in the military, or are female (Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005; Horowitz and Stam 2010; Koch and Fulton 2011). I summarize the theoretical argument linking each personal characteristic with hawkish foreign policy preferences below.

Older leaders, sensing that both their lives and their time in office are coming to an end (and subsequently their ability to control events), will attempt to cement their legacies by using their power as political leader to accomplish as much as possible, as *quickly* as possible, leading naturally to more risky choices than might otherwise have made (Horowitz,

[5]The causal process linking a leader's experience with the probability of being targeted is modeled in figure 2.1 as the causal path, 1–2–3–4–5.

McDermott, and Stam 2005). In other words, when there is a high probability that a leader will lose office tomorrow regardless of whether they take whatever actions are necessary to remain in office, then that leader will put more stock in the pursuit of glory and become less willing to make concessions. As the authors note, "younger leaders may have relatively longer time horizons and hence be more willing to delay taking risky decisions than older leaders" (Horowitz et al. 2005, 668). Empirical analyses show that there is a positive relationship between a leader's age and the likelihood that their state will initiate militarized disputes (Horowitz et al. 2005).

Horowitz and Stam (2010, 10) argue that "leaders with military experience but no combat experience should feel familiar and comfortable with the military but without the negative associations," and that leaders with any military experience, regardless of whether they saw combat, will have a higher preference for the use of force than someone who has never served. Individuals who are less averse to the use of force will also be less likely to make concessions during negotiations. Indeed, the authors' empirical analyses show that there is a positive relationship between military service of any kind and the likelihood that a leader's state will initiate militarized disputes.[6] This contrasts with earlier research by Gelpi and Feaver (2002) which showed that the number of veterans in the U.S political elite has a negative effect on the likelihood that the U.S. will use force, but a positive effect on the amount of force used whenever the U.S. enters into a militarized dispute nonetheless. Sechser (2004) argues that the more conservative behavior observed among military officers in advanced democracies is a product of strong civilian oversight and that, all else being equal, military officers have a stronger incentive to promote the use of force than do civilian leaders. This argument is supported by Horowitz and Stam (2010), who find that a leader's military service is positively related to the probability that their state initiates militarized disputes.

[6]In order from least hawkish to most hawkish: Someone who never served – someone who served and saw combat – someone who served but never saw combat.

Scholars have long speculated that an individual's gender might affect their foreign policy preferences (Goldstein 2003). Koch and Fulton (2011) argue that the struggle to overcome gender biases causes female politicians to become less conciliatory than their male counterparts once they reach executive positions. The authors' empirical analyses show that advanced democracies exhibit higher conflict behavior when the political leader is female (Koch and Fulton 2011).[7] Similarly, Swers (2007) found that female U.S. Senators becomes more likely to sponsor defense related bills when they have been challenged on their credibility regarding national security issues. Koch and Fulton (2011) argue that such struggles actually cause females to not only pursue, but prefer, hawkish foreign policies once that attain an executive position such as foreign minister, defense minister, or political leader.

I should note that I distinguish between a leader's experience and a leader's hawkish foreign policy preferences. Although both qualities impact the leader's willingness to make concessions during negotiations, the causal mechanisms are different. Inexperienced leaders are more willing to make concessions due to domestic political pressures, not because of any change in their preferred policies (Gelpi and Grieco 2001). Leaders who are older, have served in the military, or are female – or who have more hawkish foreign policy preferences for different reasons – are less likely to make concessions during negotiations because they actually prefer more aggressive foreign policies (Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005; Horowitz and Stam 2010; Koch and Fulton 2011). This will become important later on.

Part of the causal chain linking a leader's inexperience with the likelihood that their state is targeted is a change in the expected costs incurred by the challenging state. Because leaders with hawkish foreign policy preferences are less likely to make concessions during negotiations, they should be perceived as being costlier targets by other states and should

[7]Because testosterone declines with age, Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005) had expected to find a negative effect from leaders' age on the likelihood that they initiate militarized disputes. Instead the authors find a *positive* effect. Recent experimental research has also cast some doubt on the relationship between testosterone and aggression, suggesting that males appear more aggressive because of some other gender-related, but non-hormonal variable (Johnson et al. 2006, 2513-8).

therefore be targeted less often. This argument is implied, but not tested, by Gelpi and Grieco (2001), who argue that inexperienced leaders, being *more* conciliatory, are *more* likely to be targeted.

There are some situations in which a leader's hawkishness could make them more likely to be targeted (and, vice versa, where their dovishness makes them less likely to be targeted). For example, in Snyder's (1989) examination of the Soviet leadership, he finds that increased conflict with the United States benefitted the hardliners in the Soviet government, while compromises with the United States benefitted the dovish elites in the Soviet government. Colaresi (2004) finds that leaders are more likely to lose power if they are perceived as being too dovish towards a rival. Finally, whether they are hawkish or dovish, leaders often experience an increase in their public support following the initiation of international conflict – the "rally around the flag effect" – although those increases tend to be temporary (Brody and Page 1975; Norpoth 1987). All else being equal, however, an individual's willingness to use force (and concurrent unwillingness to make concessions) should decrease the probability that their state is targeted – provided that that individual is sufficiently influential in foreign policy decision-making – because the potential costs of challenging that state will have increased.

Personal characteristics such as age, military service, and gender signal that the leader is less likely to cooperate because the leader has personal characteristics that have been shown to increase a person's innate hawkish foreign policy preferences, therefore increasing the hawkish preferences of the overall political leadership in the leader's country, decreasing the probability that potential challengers will be able to extract concessions from the leader's country, and lowering the probability that the leader's country will be targeted. [8] A measure of innate hawkish foreign policy preferences could be generated using data on an individual's age, military service, and gender. I discuss this in more detail later on in the chapter.[9]

[8]This causal process is modeled in figure 2.1 as the causal path, 7–8–9–3–4–5.

[9]Bak and Palmer (2010) show that a leader's tenure can interact with their age to affect the likelihood of

Redd (2002, 342) claims that because advisors "participate extensively in presidential decision making, any explanation of processes and outcomes should account for their presence." Indeed, if political leaders are influenced by their advisors, then it should matter *who* those advisors are, since any variation in the advice received by political leaders has the potential to affect policy outcomes. It follows that any variable affecting the advice that foreign policy advisors give to the political leader has the potential to affect state-level policy outcomes.[10]

Since I can only focus on so many individual actors, I have chosen the foreign and defense ministers. Virtually every country has one of each, and there is no shortage of case studies, anecdotes, and historical records documenting their importance and influence.[11] For example, the advice given to the Russian Tsar by his foreign minister, Serge Sazonov, is considered partly responsible for convincing the Tsar to mobilize Russian troops along the Western front, therefore accelerating the outbreak of World War I. To read the minister's own memoirs, it is hard to believe he did not know the consequences of his own advice, claiming that "if the Tsar ordered general military mobilization ... Germany would be forced to declare war on Russia, lest the slow Russian process of preparing for war advance to the point that Germany would face a prepared France in the West and a mobilized Russia in the East" (Sazonov 1928, 4). Nevertheless, the Minister advised the Tsar during a private meeting on July 30, 1914 that he had no choice but to order full military mobilization. His

being targeted depending on the leader's ideology (for example, an inexperienced leader's age matters more if they are a republican). The theoretical argument in this chapter constitutes an alternative explanation for why those variables might interact to affect the likelihood of being targeted. Moreover, because I incorporate data on sub-leader individual actors into the empirical analyses later on in this chapter, my analyses could also be seen as an extension of Bak and Palmer's (2010) work.

[10]In 1989, U.S. President George H.W. Bush introduced Condoleezza Rice to Mikhail Gorbachev, saying, "This is Condoleezza Rice ... She tells me everything I know about the Soviet Union" (Ratnesar, Carney, and Waller 1999). The President was likely being facetious. But if he were telling the truth, it would probably matter whether the individual providing him with all of his knowledge about the Soviet Union was providing him with particularly hawkish advice.

[11]There are a variety of positions that exist in virtually every country that I could have focused on (and that I may focus on in future studies), including head military generals, vice presidents/prime ministers, and joint chiefs. Although different countries will assign different levels of influence to each position, I expect that on average the foreign and defense ministers will be among the more influential voices regarding foreign and defense policy.

account of that meeting reads as follows:

> The Tsar was silent. Then he said to me, in a voice full of deep feeling: "This would mean sending hundreds of thousands of Russian people to their death. Who can help hesitating to take such a step?" I answered that the responsibility for the precious lives carried away by the war would not fall upon him. Neither he nor his government desired the war thrust upon Russia and Europe by the ill-will of the enemy, determined to increase their power (Sazonov 1928, 4).

Agreeing with this advice, the Tsar nodded his head and then ordered a military build-up along the Western border. Germany declared war on Russia the next day.

Two days prior, on June 28th, 1914, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was informed via an urgent communication that "the hereditary archduke of Austria and his wife have been today assassinated at Sarajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite" (Diplomatic Documents, 23). Afterward, a lower-level French diplomat begged the foreign affairs minister not to "embark on such a course" (24), referring to open warfare against Austria. Such desperate pleas to the foreign affairs minister imply that the minister held significant influence over policy outcomes, or at least over the political leader's decision-making.

On June 28th, 1960, an article in *The Miami News* began, "Venezuela is on the verge of war with the Dominican Republic" (DuBois 1960, 1). The burgeoning crisis was the result of a roadside bomb explosion that injured the Venezuelan president, Romulo Betancourt Bello, as well as the defense minister, Gen. Josue Lopez Henriquez, and the defense minister's wife. Blame for the attack quickly fell on the leader of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo. Shortly thereafter the Venezuelan president delegated the task of gaining U.S. support for the war effort to his foreign minister, Ignacio Luis Arcaya (DuBois 1960).

The theoretical arguments linking a leader's age, military service, and gender with more hawkish foreign policy preferences are not based on anything particular to the political leader, but to general human psychology. Unless there is something unusual about the set of individuals who go on to become political leaders, I suspect that most individuals will develop more hawkish foreign policy preferences once they are older or have served in the military, and that most females will have become more hawkish once they work towards an executive position. Koch and Fulton (2011) have, in fact, already shown that advanced democracies tend to have higher defense budgets and conflict behavior when their foreign and defense ministers are female.[12]

Foreign and defense ministers are certainly no strangers to the horrors of war or to aggressive behavior. Yukihiko Ikeda, the Defense Minister of Japan from 1990-1991, personally witnessed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima from a remote village outside the city (MOFA Japan). Nicanor Costa Mendez was the foreign minister of Argentina during the invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. In defending his role in planning the invasion, Mendez remarked: "All I have to say is that I fought in defense of the Argentine national interest and of my country's sovereignty" (New York Times 1992). In 1958, the defense minister of Uruguay, Raul Gaudin, challenged a member of the Uruguayan Congress to a pistol duel in which no one was hurt (figure 2.2).

Leaders do not make foreign policy decisions in a vacuum. They must rely upon information from their advisors (including the foreign and defense ministers) to make policy decisions. If their foreign and defense ministers have more hawkish foreign policy preferences, then the leader will be provided with more hawkish foreign policy advice and should there-

[12]There is some variation in the effect of military service and gender on individuals' innate hawkish foreign policy preferences. For example, an individual's military service has less impact upon their personal hawkishness when the person not only served in the military, but saw combat (Horowitz and Stam 2010). Similarly, the positive impact from having a female leader on the conflict behavior of the leader's state decreases with the number of female legislators in the state's legislature (Koch and Fulton 2011). All else being equal, however, an individual's military service and female gender both have a positive effect on that individual's innate hawkish foreign policy preferences.



No One Hurt In Uruguayan Duel

Montevideo, Uruguay, July 5 (AP) — Uruguay's defense minister and a congressman fought a duel with pistols today at an airfield near Montevideo Each fired two shots. Neither was hurt.

Raul Gaudin, the defense minister, challenged Enrique Erro, a member of the Herrerista Party, after the congressman charged fraud in the administration of the National Aviation Museum.

Figure 2.2: "No One Hurt in Uruguayan Duel." *Reading Eagle*, July 6, 1958.

fore become more likely to respond aggressively to external challenges.[13] In other words, it is not just the views of the political leader that matter, but the views of the overall political leadership. Assuming that other states can identify the foreign and defense ministers within a leader's government, leaders whose foreign and defense ministers have more hawkish foreign policy preferences should be viewed as being more likely to respond aggressively to external challenges and less likely to make concessions during negotiations, therefore increasing the expected cost of targeting those leaders, and decreasing the probability that those leaders are targeted.[14]

When there are significant executive constraints in a leader's country, then the leader's policy preferences will not influence the number of concessions that the state makes during

[13]Recent research on political psychology has found that individuals often reaffirm inaccurate views when they are presented with evidence in support of the other side (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). So it is possible that some leaders might become *less* aggressive when presented with more aggressive advice.

[14]This causal process is modeled in figure 2.1 as the causal path, 8a–9–3–4–5.

negotiations, and the leader's policy preferences should not influence the likelihood that their state is targeted. For example, country A will not concern themselves with the policy preferences of the leader of country B if that leader is not able to increase the level of aggression with which their state responds to challenges. The same is true for the leader's foreign policy advisors, and for the political leadership in general. When there are significant executive constraints, the advice that the leader receives from their foreign and defense ministers will have less impact upon policy outcomes because the leader does not have as much ability to carry out their ministers' advice. Potential challengers will not concern themselves with the policy preferences of the foreign and defense ministers in countries where the leader's behavior is significantly constrained.[15] I make the following hypotheses:

> ***Hypothesis 1***: The hawkish foreign policy preferences of a state's political leadership have a negative effect on the likelihood that that state is targeted.
>
> ***Hypothesis 1a***: The marginal effect of the hawkish foreign policy preferences of a state's political leadership on the likelihood that that state is targeted is negative at all levels of executive constraints, but weakens as executive constraints increase.

Now we have something that political leaders can select in their foreign and defense ministers to help themselves remain in power. Scholars have already shown that political leaders can use the selection of sub-leader individual actors (SLIAs) to signal policy preferences and to achieve more favorable outcomes, at least in political economy. Chwieroth (2007)

[15]Similarly, I do not expect that the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the political leadership will have as much impact when the state does not have the capabilities to carry out hawkish policies. For example, the U.S. does not generally care about the hawkishness of the political leadership of Madagascar. Variation in the hawkish preferences of the political leadership in a country with few capabilities should not matter as much as variation in the hawkish preferences of the political leadership in a country like China (which actually has the wherewithal to carry out hawkish policies. In the empirical analyses, I describe several robustness checks that I perform in order to ensure that my findings are not the result of the few most powerful dyads biasing the results.

finds that political leaders are more likely to appoint economic advisors with a neoliberal economic education whenever their state experiences above average turnover rates in the central bank leadership, presumably to signal to potential investors that their state remains a safe, attractive destination for foreign investment, and making the leader's claim that that their state remains an attractive place for investment more credible.[16]

Although all leaders could benefit from the selection of foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences, leaders who are more likely to be targeted have a disproportionate need to signal aggression, and should therefore be more likely to select ministers who can decrease the likelihood that the leader is targeted. In other words, leaders who are not an appealing target do not have as great a need to take actions that will decrease their appeal as a target. If the causal process linking a leader's experience with the probability of being targeted is correct (see figure 2.1), then inexperienced leaders should be more likely to select ministers with personal characteristics that have been shown to increase a person's innate hawkish foreign policy preferences (who are older, have served in the military, or are female), and more likely to select ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences in general.

Recent experimental work lends support to this argument. Spisak (2012) argues that there is a positive relationship between a leader's age and their image as a dominant leader. He runs an experiment in which he manipulates the faces of hypothetical presidential candidates to appear older or younger and finds that older looking candidates receive an increase in support during times of war. Leaders cannot control their own age, but they do have some control over the age of their foreign and defense ministers. Leaders who perceive an increased likelihood of external challenges – such as inexperienced leaders – should be more

[16]In a similar study, Thies (2009) found that central bankers who exhibit high levels of conceptual complexity are better able to reduce exchange rate volatility in their country. A person's conceptual complexity is measured by the frequency with which they use words that introduce complexity and nuance into their descriptions. For example, words such as *approximately*, *possibility*, and *for example* are considered conceptually complex, while *absolutely*, *certainly*, and *without a doubt* are not.

likely to appoint foreign and defense ministers who appear older.

Not all leaders, however, will exhibit the same relationship between their experience and the policy preferences of their ministers. If a leader does not care as much about remaining in power, then the relationship between a leader's experience and the selection of hawkish ministers should weaken because the leader will no longer care about events that threaten their hold on power (like being targeted). The fact that their inexperience makes them more likely to be targeted would no longer drive their selection of foreign and defense ministers.

I view the baseline leader as caring solely about remaining in power. Any increase in the leader's preference for specific policies that has nothing to do with remaining in power will cause the leader to care more about those preferred policies and less about remaining in power. I posit that a leader's age, military service, and gender cause them to care more about pursuing hawkish foreign policies for reasons that have nothing to do with remaining in power. For example, older leaders – being uncertain whether they can remain in power even if they do everything that is necessary to do so – start to care more about legacy-building, and about using their power as political leader to accomplish as much as possible, as quickly as possible, leading naturally to more risky choices than would have been made by a leader who cared solely about remaining in power.[17] So inexperienced leaders who *care solely about remaining in power* will tend to select ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences. But leaders who have become more hawkish for reasons that have nothing to do with remaining in power will not care as much about remaining in power, and the fact that their inexperience makes them a more appealing target will not affect their selection of

[17]It is not only possible, but common, for a leader's preferred policies to be the same policies that would maximize their time in office. There is not always a tension between the two goals. All else being equal, however, whenever a leader's decision-making is not focused on remaining in power, I expect that the probability with which the policies pursued by the political leader are the same policies that would maximize their time in office will decrease.

ministers.[18]

This provides an alternative explanation for why Barack Obama selected Hillary Clinton (an older female) and Robert Gates (an older male who had served in the military) as his foreign and defense ministers upon entering office in January 2009. My theory predicts that Obama would not have been as likely to make those selections if he had been older, had served in the military, or been female himself upon entering office, because previous research has suggested that a president with those characteristics would have had more hawkish foreign policy preferences, and their inexperience would not have provided as much motivation to use the selection of foreign and defense ministers to signal aggression. This stands in contrast to the more common narrative that those selections were part of Obama's effort to construct a "team of rivals" or to make bipartisan appointments. I make the following hypotheses:

> ***Hypothesis 2***: A leader's experience has a negative effect on the likelihood of choosing foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences.

> ***Hypothesis 2a***: The marginal effect of leaders' experience on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of their foreign and defense ministers is negative at all levels of the leader's own hawkish foreign policy preferences, but weakens as the leader's hawkish preferences increase.

[18]Similarly, I expect that a leader's experience and policy preferences will have less impact upon the personal characteristics of the foreign and defense ministers when the leader has less control over the selection of those ministers.

2.3 Testing Hypotheses on the Probability of Being Targeted

Research Design

Hypotheses 1 and 1a require the estimation of the following statistical model:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(\text{Targeted}) = b_0 &+ b_1\text{*Defender: Hawkish Preferences} \\ &+ b_2\text{*Executive Constraints} \\ &+ b_3\text{*Defender: Hawkish Preferences * Executive Constraints} \\ &+ b_4...b_n\text{*Controls} + \epsilon \text{ [Equation 1]}\end{aligned}$$

I observe the population of politically relevant dyads between 1950 and 2000 and construct a *directed-dyad-year* data set. Politically relevant dyads are defined as the set of dyads in which the two countries are contiguous, or where at least one of the countries is a major power.[19] I focus on politically relevant dyads because they represent the set of dyads in which there is some possibility of a conflict actually being initiated (Lemke and Reed 2001).

Because the probability of being targeted is not directly observable, the variable, *Pr(Targe ted)*, is actually a binary measure indicating whether or not an international crisis involving the defending state is initiated by the challenging state during a particular dyad-year. The data was drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). I use the ICB data set rather than the more common Correlates of War (COW) Militarized International Dispute (MID) data set because the ICB data set includes more detailed information about each conflict, making it easier to identify those conflicts in which the foreign and defense ministers played a prominent role. Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, probit is an appropriate choice when estimating the statistical model shown in equation 1.

[19] I used dyads where the states were contiguous by land or were separated by as much as 151-400 miles of water.

Focusing on the behavior of multiple individual actors presents some unique challenges when it comes time to test the central hypotheses. First and foremost, my hypotheses require data on the time in office and hawkish foreign policy preferences of leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers that, prior to this study, was not yet available.[20] Furthermore, building a variable for the innate hawkish foreign policy preferences of each individual actor requires data on a variety of personal characteristics that previous literature has shown affect an individual's hawkishness, including their age, military service, and gender. With the exception of military service, the data on political leaders was already available in the latest incarnation of the Archigos data set (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). As part of my dissertation research, I have collected the necessary data on foreign and defense ministers, as well as the data on the military service of political leaders.[21]

Information on the tenure, age, military service, and gender of many foreign and defense ministers was readily available. It simply needed to be put through the coding process. There are several online resources containing information on political leaders and the major ministries and portfolios, with varying spatial and temporal domains and varying degrees of accuracy. Primary sources for the data set included the website, *Rulers*, governments' own historical records, and archived newspapers from the year of observation.[22] Most observations were confirmed at least twice through a variety of secondary sources, including United Nations transcripts, interview transcripts, historical records, and additional archived newspaper articles from the year of observation.

Because states often have multiple political leaders during a particular year, Gelpi and Grieco (2001) eschew the dyad-year as their unit of analysis and instead construct a data set

[20] Although none of my hypotheses explicitly require data on ministers' time in office, the data is necessary in order the prevent the omitted variable bias that might result from including either age or time in office, but not the other, in the statistical model.

[21] At present, the data set on foreign and defense ministers only goes back to 1950. But I hope to expand the temporal domain for future projects.

[22] http://www.rulers.org

using the leader-dyad-year as the unit of analysis.[23] Because states can also have multiple foreign or defense ministers during a particular year, it may have been appropriate to use the leader-foreign minister-defense minister-dyad-year as the unit of observation (the *political leadership*-dyad-year). However, it is often the case that the exact date of investiture for the foreign and defense ministers cannot be determined – only the years in which a certain individual served in their position – and my hypotheses require that I do not incorrectly attribute individuals who served as foreign or defense minister to leaders that they never served under. One solution would be to limit the analysis to major powers and to use the leader-foreign minister-defense minister-dyad-year as the unit of observation. Indeed, the exact dates of investiture for the foreign and defense ministers are readily available for countries that are major powers, or that are western european democracies. But limiting my analyses to one of those spatial domains would severely limit the inferences that I can make regarding leaders' and ministers' policy preferences and the likelihood of being targeted.

It is easier to determine with a high degree of confidence the *last* individual to have served as foreign or defense minister during a particular country-year. For example, the last individual to serve as the foreign minister of Thailand in 1985 will be mentioned in government records and/or newspaper articles in both 1985 and 1986 (unless, of course, that individual left office on December 31st, 1985), while an individual who served for only part of 1985 – and not the final part, therefore never serving for any portion of the year 1986 – will not be mentioned in any records or newspaper reports as having carried out official foreign minister duties during 1986. So even when the exact dates of investiture for the foreign and defense ministers are unknown, I can still accurately determine who was serving as leader, foreign minister, and defense minister at the end of each country-year, therefore making it possible to create a country-year data set containing variables for the personal

[23] Leader-dyad-year observations are only distinguishable from dyad-year observations whenever one of the states belonging to a dyad experiences a turnover in the political leadership during that year.

characteristics of each individual actor using information on the last individuals to have served in each capacity during each year. The country-year data can then be incorporated into a dyad-year data set for which I am confident that the leader, foreign minister, and defense minister in one country served at the same time as the leader, foreign minister, and defense minister in the other country, therefore making it possible to accurately test my hypotheses. For dyad-years in which a conflict is initiated, I ensure that the initiation is not attributed to the wrong individuals (on either the challenging or defending side).

Assuming that there is nothing unusual about individuals who serve in executive positions during the last months of the year (as opposed to the earlier months), it should not significantly bias the results to exclude those individuals who served as leader, foreign minister, and defense minister earlier in the year. Ultimately, I am making a tradeoff between my desire to include all individuals in the analysis and my desire to ensure that I do not inaccurately attribute individuals who served as foreign and defense minister to leaders whom they never served under.

Primary sources often identified a country's foreign or defense minister as being the same individual who served as that country's political leader during that year. In some cases, this was literally true. In Israel, for example, the prime minister automatically holds any vacant cabinet posts until they are filled. But in some cases, it was simply assumed that, for lack of another individual officially holding the title of foreign minister, the political leader of that country must have taken on the duties of the foreign minister. For my analyses, I believe that it would be a mistake to include any instances of political leaders serving concurrently as foreign minister because I am attempting to isolate the effect from the advice given to the political leader by his/her foreign and defense ministers, as well as the actual power over foreign policy exercised by individual actors other than the political leader. Therefore, whenever a primary source considered a state's leader to be its foreign or defense minister as well, I recorded that country as not having the relevant minister during that year (effectively

dropping the observation from the data set).

The variables, *Leader Tenure*, *Foreign Minister Tenure*, and *Defense Minister Tenure*, indicate the number of years that a leader, foreign minister, or defense minister has served in their position prior to a particular country-year. The variables, *Leader Age*, *Foreign Minister Age*, and *Defense Minister Age*, indicate the age (in years) of the individual serving in each position during a particular country-year. The variables, *Leader Female*, *Foreign Minister Female*, and *Defense Minister Female*, are binary, and indicate whether or not the individual serving in each position is female (=1) during a particular country-year. The variables, *Leader Military Service*, *Foreign Minister Military Service*, and *Defense Minister Military Service*, are also binary, and indicate whether or not an individual served in their country's military (=1) prior to attaining their position (as leader, foreign minister, or defense minister).[24] In table 2.1, I provide an example of how the data is coded.

An individual's hawkish foreign policy preferences have been shown to increase as they grow older, have served in the military, or are female.[25] Therefore, I operationalize the innate hawkish foreign policy preferences of each individual actor as an additive index with a 3-point scale: the variables, *Leader Hawkish Preferences*, *Foreign Minister Hawkish Preferences*, and *Defense Minister Hawkish Preferences*. An individual receives one point if they are female, one point if they served in the military prior to entering their position, and one point if they are over 60 years old.[26] I have no expectation regarding which characteristic (age, military service, or gender) has the largest effect on an individual's hawkishness. But I do expect that the effect is additive; that an actor with two of the aforementioned characteristics (a

[24]Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in appendix A.

[25]Females have only been shown to exhibit more hawkish behavior than their male counterparts when they have gained an executive position, which is indeed the case for the leader, foreign minister, and defense minister (Koch and Fulton 2011).

[26]The exact cut-off year for age is arbitrary. But it is necessary to transform an individual's age into a binary variable so that age is not weighted heavier than military service and gender. Age cutoffs of 50 and 70 years old produce similar results. It may be better to create an age cutoff that varies across countries, perhaps based on variation in the life expectancy in each country.

Table 2.1: United States of America, 2001-2011

Year	Foreign Minister	Tenure	Age	Military	Female	Leader	Tenure	Age	Military	Female
2001	Colin Powell	0	63	1	0	George Bush	0	54	1	0
2002	Colin Powell	1	64	1	0	George Bush	1	55	1	0
2003	Colin Powell	2	65	1	0	George Bush	2	56	1	0
2004	Colin Powell	3	66	1	0	George Bush	3	57	1	0
2005	Condoleezza Rice	0	46	0	1	George Bush	4	58	1	0
2006	Condoleezza Rice	1	47	0	1	George Bush	5	59	1	0
2007	Condoleezza Rice	2	48	0	1	George Bush	6	60	1	0
2008	Condoleezza Rice	3	49	0	1	George Bush	7	61	1	0
2009	Hillary Clinton	0	62	0	1	Barack Obama	0	48	0	0
2010	Hillary Clinton	1	63	0	1	Barack Obama	1	49	0	0
2011	Hillary Clinton	2	64	0	1	Barack Obama	2	50	0	0

leader who is older and has served in the military) will be more hawkish than an actor with only one characteristic (who has served in the military but is very young). The variable, *Defender Hawkish Preferences*, is the sum of the personal hawkishness scores of the leader, foreign minister, and defense minister during a particular country-year, therefore measuring the overall hawkishness of the leader and his/her foreign and defense ministers (the decision-maker and the decision-maker's sources of information). If two actors each have one of those personal characteristics, then I expect to observe the same decrease in the probability that their state is targeted that I would observe if one actor had two of those characteristics.

A standard set of control variables is included in the analysis. To assess whether a state's capabilities affect the leader's ability to use the selection of foreign and defense minister for strategic purposes (in other words, do potential opponents care about the defending state's hawkishness when the defending state has fewer capabilities?), I include the variable, *Relative Capabilities*, which measures the difference in the capabilities of each country during a particular country-dyad-year.[27] The variable is constructed using data from the Composite Index of National Capability from the National Material Capabilities data set (Singer 1987), which incorporates a state's total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditures, energy consumption and iron and steel production. Previous research has found that a country's political system and economic conditions affects its experiences with international conflict. The variable, *Joint Democracy*, is binary, and indicates whether or not both countries have a Polity score greater than or equal to 6 during a particular dyad-year (=1). The variable, *Dyadic Trade*, measures the total amount of bilateral trade between two countries during a particular dyad-year. I account for time dependence by incorporating the variable, *Peace Years* (which measures the number of years that the two countries belonging to a particular dyad have not been involved in an international crisis), into the model, as

[27]To ensure that the results are not driven by the most powerful dyads, I reproduce the results in table 2.3 for the top 50% of defending state capabilities. The results are provided in table A.2 in appendix A. There are no significant changes.

Table 2.2: Parameter Expectations for the Probability that the Challenging State Initiates a Crisis Involving the Defending State

Regressor	*Expectation*
Defending State Hawkish Preferences	-
Defending State Hawkish Preferences * Executive Constraints	+

well as a series of cubic splines, using procedures recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). The variable, *Dyad Duration*, measures the total number of years that a particular dyad has been in existence prior to each dyad-year. The control variables were constructed using Eugene (v3.204; Bennett and Stam 2000).

Results

Because the variable, *Pr(Targeted)*, is a binary measure indicating whether or not the defending state is targeted by the challenger state during a particular dyad-year, I estimate the statistical model in equation 1 using probit. To demonstrate that any substantive relationships hold across different model specifications, I estimate the statistical model without any control variables (model 1) before estimating the full statistical model (model 2). The results are shown in table 2.3.[28]

From a substantive standpoint, the statistics in the first two rows provide the most important results. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the variable, *Defender Hawkish Preferences*, is both negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the hawkish foreign policy prefer-

[28]An international crisis was initiated in 75 of the dyad-year observations used to generate the results in model 2 in table 2.3. This is a very small percentage of the total number of observations. In order to ensure that this does not bias the results in favor of the research hypotheses, I reproduce the results in table 2.3 using the rare-event procedures recommended by King and Zeng (2001). There are no significant changes in the results.

Table 2.3: Probit Analysis of Hawkish Preferences and the Probability that the Challenging State Initiates an International Crisis Involving the Defending State (1950-2000)

Defending State	(1)	(2)
Hawkish Preferences	-.1472***	-.1182***
0 = Low Hawkishness, 9 = High Hawkishness	(.0273)	(.0416)
Hawkish Preferences * Executive Constraints	.0362***	.0227**
interaction	(.0088)	(.0110)
Executive Constraints	-.1948***	-.1592***
0 = No executive constraints, 6 = Total executive constraints	(.0336)	(.0435)
Leader Tenure	.0029	.0027
Number of years that the political leader has served in that position	(.0048)	(.0056)
Foreign Minister Tenure	-.0038	.0009
Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position	(.0076)	(.0084)
Defense Minister Tenure	.0178***	.0133*
Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position	(.0060)	(.0076)
Controls		
Relative Capabilities		-1.426***
Defender capabilities minus Challenger capabilities		(.3718)
Joint Democracy		-.3285*
dummy, 1 = Both countries have a Polity score $\geq$ 6.		(.1724)
Dyadic Trade		-.0001*
Total volume of bilateral trade between the two countries in a dyad		(.0000)
Dyad Duration		.0024**
Number of years that the country-dyad has been in existence		(.0010)
Peace Years		-.1966***
Number of years since the last crisis involving the two countries		(.0343)
Spline 1		-.0014***
		(.0004)
Spine 2		.0006**
		(.0003)
Spline 3		-.0001
		(.0002)
Constant	-2.145***	-1.346***
	(.1149)	(.1834)
Log Likelihood	-649.46	-419.15
N	38,256	28,927

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

ences of the political leadership in the defending state have a negative effect on the probability that an international crisis will be initiated by the challenger state during a particular dyad-year (table 2.3, models 1-2). Furthermore, the coefficient for the interaction term, *Defender Hawkish Preferences * Executive Constraints*, is both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the marginal effect of the variable, *Defender Hawkish Preferences*, grows weaker as the political leadership in that state becomes more constrained (table 2.3, models 1-2). In other words, when the political leadership has less control over foreign policy, then the policy preferences of the political leadership have less impact upon policy outcomes, specifically on the probability that that state will be targeted in an international crisis.

These results are robust to the disaggregation of the variable, *Defender Hawkish Preferences*, into separate variables for each individual actor (*Leader Hawkish Preferences*, *Foreign Minister Hawkish Preferences*, and *Defense Minister Hawkish Preferences*), although only the leaders' and foreign ministers' hawkish preferences appear to affect the likelihood that a state is targeted. The results are provided in table A.3 in appendix A.

To better illustrate the interactive relationship between the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the political leadership and executive constraints, I graph the marginal effect of the variable, *Defender Hawkish Preferences*, as the executive constraints in the defending state increase from no constraints to total constraints (measured as a discrete, ordinal scale from 0-6), while holding all other variables constant at their mean values and using procedures recommended by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). 95% confidence intervals are shown as dashed lines (figure 2.4). I also provide the distribution of executive constraints across the observations used to generate the marginal effects plot (figure 2.3). As predicted, the marginal effect of *Defender Hawkish Preferences* is negative when there are zero executive constraints in the defending state. The upward slope indicates that the marginal effect weakens as the level of executive constraints in the defending state increase and the political leadership has less control over the country's response to external challenges.



Figure 2.3: Distribution of Executive Constraints in the Defending State



Figure 2.4: Marginal Effect of Defending State Hawkish Preferences on the Probability that the Challenging State Initiates an International Crisis Involving the Defending State

2.4 Testing Hypotheses on Ministers' Hawkishness

Research Design

Because inexperienced leaders are targeted more often (Gelpi and Grieco 2001), and political leaders can decrease the likelihood that they are targeted by selecting foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences (table 2.3, models 1-2), I hypothesized that a leader's experience would have a negative effect on the probability that they selected foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences (H2) and that this effect should weaken as the leader's own hawkish foreign policy preferences increased (causing the leader to care less about remain in power, and therefore less about avoiding external challenges; H2a).

Although the two sets of hypotheses in chapter two (Hypotheses 1 and 1a on the probability of crisis initiation and Hypotheses 2 and 2a on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the foreign and defense ministers) are separate and do not necessarily require the use of a selection model (or, more generally, the simultaneous consideration of both sets of hypotheses), I should note that the relationship between the two dependent variables is likely somewhat endogenous. For example, crisis initiation affects the leader's time in office, which I have hypothesized affects the leader's selection of foreign and defense ministers. Similarly, I have hypothesized that a leader's time in office affects their selection of foreign and defense ministers, the latter of which I have hypothesized affects the probability of crisis initiation.

Hypotheses 2 and 2a require the estimation of the following statistical model:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Ministers' Hawkish Preferences} = b_0 &+ b_1\text{*Leader Tenure} \\ &+ b_2\text{*Leader Hawkish Preferences} \\ &+ b_3\text{*Leader Tenure * Leader Hawkish Preferences} \\ &+ b_4 \ldots b_n\text{*Controls} + \epsilon \text{ [Equation 2]}\end{aligned}$$

The unit of observation is the country-year. I observe the same spatial-temporal domain

that I use to analyze the probability of being targeted (a population of 164 countries between 1950-2000). The dependent variable, *Ministers' Hawkish Preferences*, is calculated as the sum of the personal hawkishness scores of the foreign and defense ministers during a particular country-year. The independent variables are the time in office and hawkish foreign policy preferences of the political leader. I also control for the time in office of the foreign minister and defense minister in order to decrease the probability of committing a Type I error. This is because one of the components of a leader's hawkish preferences – their age – is strongly correlated with the same component of their foreign and defense ministers' hawkish preferences (since everyone ages at the same rate). So hawkish leaders will naturally appear to select hawkish ministers for reasons that have nothing to do with the theoretical argument linking the hawkish preferences of each actor if one does not control for their time in office. The above variables are all coded using information on the *last* individuals to serve in each position during a particular country-year, to ensure that the individuals comprising each leader-foreign minister-defense minister pair in fact served with each other.

Because the probability of crisis initiation and the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the leader's foreign and defense ministers are such markedly different dependent variables, they require different control variables in the statistical model. For example, although material capabilities may affect the probability that the defending state is targeted, they are less likely to affect the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the foreign and defense ministers that the leader selects. In my analyses of the probability that the defending state is targeted, I both control for executive constraints and interact executive constraints with the primary independent variable, *Hawkish Preferences*. In my analyses of the hawkish foreign preferences of the foreign and defense ministers, I am not necessarily interested in the impact from executive constraints on the dependent variable so much as I am interested in the impact from regime type more generally. To account for the possibility that a country's regime type might affect the selection of foreign and defense ministers, I include the variable, *Winning*

Coalition Size, which measures the size of a country's winning coalition during a particular country-year (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004). I also include the variable, *Major Power*, which is binary, and indicates whether or not a leader's country was considered to have been a major power during a particular country-year (=1). I should note that because democracies experience more frequent turnover in the political leadership than do autocracies, the use of country-year data – which necessitates the elimination of some leader-minister pairs – introduces some bias into the analysis by eliminating more leader-minister pairs in democracies than in autocracies. This is ameliorated to some extent by controlling for states' winning coalition size in the statistical model. Ultimately, however, it is a bias that I am willing to introduce in order to ensure that each leader-minister pair is accurate, which increases my ability to infer from the statistical results that leaders with certain levels of experience or hawkishness are more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences.

Results

Due to the discrete and additive nature of the dependent variable, ordered probit is an appropriate choice when estimating the statistical model in equation 2. The results are shown in table 2.5. From a substantive standpoint, the statistics in the first two rows provide the most important results. The coefficient for the variable, *Leader Tenure*, is both negative and statistically significant, suggesting that experienced leaders are less likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences. This provides support for hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the coefficient for the interaction term, *Leader Tenure* * *Leader Hawkish Preferences*, is both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the negative effect from leaders' experience on the selection of ministers with hawkish preferences begins to weaken as the leader's own hawkish foreign policy preferences begin to increase (table 2.5, model 2). This is consistent with what we would expect if a leader does not care

Table 2.4: Parameter Expectations for the Hawkish Preferences of The Foreign and Defense Ministers

Regressor	*Expectation*
Leader Tenure	-
Leader Tenure * Leader Hawkish Preferences	+

as much about remaining in power when they have more hawkish foreign policy preferences, and is therefore not as strongly affected by the fact that their inexperience makes them a likely target.

These results are robust to alternative modeling strategies, such as ordered logistic regression (see table A.5 in appendix A). They are also robust to the disaggregation of the dependent variable, *Ministers' Hawkish Preferences*, into separate variables for each minister, *Foreign Minister Hawkish Preferences*, and *Defense Minister Hawkish Preferences*. In both cases, a leader's tenure is negatively related to the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the relevant minister (see table A.6 in appendix A).[29]

To better illustrate the interactive relationship between a leader's tenure and hawkish foreign policy preferences, I graph the marginal effect of leaders' tenure on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of their foreign and defense ministers as the leader's own hawkish

[29]I also create a discrete, ordinal variable for each personal characteristic of the leader's foreign and defense ministers that is believed to increase an individual's innate hawkishness (for *age*, 1 point for each minister over 60 years of age; for *military service*, 1 point for each minister who served in the military prior to attaining their position; for *gender*, 1 point for each minister who is female). Recall that an individual's innate hawkishness is thought to increase as they grow older, have served in the military, or are female (once they have attained an executive position), so there should be a similar effect from leaders' tenure on the selection of foreign and defense ministers with each individual characteristic. For example, a leader's tenure should be negatively related to the age of their foreign and defense ministers, and this relationship should weaken as the leader's own age increases. Similarly, a leader's tenure should be negatively related to the military service of their foreign and defense ministers, and this relationship should weaken as the leader's own military service increases. I estimate the statistical model in equation 2 for each characteristic using ordered probit. The results are shown in table A.7 in appendix A.

Table 2.5: Ordered Probit Analysis of Leaders' Tenure and the Hawkish Preferences of Their Foreign and Defense Ministers (1950-2000)

	(1)	(2)
Leader Tenure *Number of years that the political leader has served in that position*	-.0145***	-.0418***
	(.0037)	(.0073)
Leader Tenure * Leader Hawkish Preferences *interaction*		.0192***
		(.0044)
Leader Hawkish Preferences *0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness*	.4129***	.3065***
	(.0371)	(.0477)
Foreign Minister Tenure *Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position*	.0319***	.0337***
	(.0063)	(.0063)
Defense Minister Tenure *Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position*	.0100**	.0093**
	(.0041)	(.0041)
Winning Coalition Size *0 = Small winning coalition, 1 = Large winning coalition*	-.4561***	-.4778***
	(.0854)	(.0861)
Major Power *dummy, 1 = The leader's country is a major power*	1.048***	1.059***
	(.0836)	(.0834)
Cut Point 1	-.6307	-.7674
	(.0789)	(.0870)
Cut Point 2	.4461	.3146
	(.0788)	(.0864)
Cut Point 3	1.479	1.356
	(.0828)	(.0890)
Cut Point 4	2.479	2.359
	(.0980)	(.1026)

Note: Observations: 2,179
Two-tailed test: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

preferences increase, while holding all other variables constant at their mean values and using procedures recommended by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). 95% confidence intervals are shown as dashed lines (figure 2.5). As predicted, the marginal effect of leaders' tenure on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of their foreign and defense ministers is at its lowest level when the leader's own hawkish preferences are at their lowest level. The marginal effect weakens (moves upwards towards zero) as the leader's own hawkish foreign policy preferences increase. Substantively, these results indicate that a leader's selection of foreign



Figure 2.5: Marginal Effect of Leaders' Tenure on the Hawkish Preferences of Their Foreign and Defense Ministers

policy advisors is not affected by personal characteristics (like tenure) that affect whether or not the leader can remain in power (for example, by increasing the probability that they are targeted) whenever the leader does not care as much about remaining in power – in this case, because the leader's own hawkishness has increased for reasons that have nothing to do with remaining in power.

These results are consistent with the example provided earlier regarding the selections of Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates as foreign minister and defense minister, respectively. A leader's tenure has a stronger effect on the selection of foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences when the leader's own hawkish preferences are low – more specifically, when the leader is younger, has not served in the military, or is male. Barack Obama had all three of these characteristics in 2009. Therefore, Barack Obama is precisely

the sort of inexperienced leader that I would expect to use the selection of foreign and defense ministers to signal aggression, by selecting individuals with personal characteristics that suggest that they have more hawkish foreign policy preferences.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I proposed the first part of an explanation of the strategic selection of foreign policy advisors. I used probit and ordered probit analyses of original data on the time in office, age, military service, and gender of the foreign and defense ministers in 164 countries between 1950 and 2000 to illustrate that the selection of General Gallardo as Minister of Defence by the President of Ecuador, Jamil Mahuad, is not only part of a larger trend, but a trend that has real, tangible effects for states' conflict behavior. The hawkishness of a state's political leadership (comprised of the political leader, foreign minister, and defense minister) has a negative effect on the likelihood that that state is targeted (table 2.3, models 1-2). Inexperienced leaders like President Mahuad are more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences, in order to signal that they are more likely to respond aggressively to external challenges (table 2.5, model 2). This effect is amplified for inexperienced leaders with less hawkish foreign policy preferences themselves (table 2.5, model 2).

President Mahuad claims to have appointed General Gallardo to be defense minister "to send a clear signal: Although Ecuador was openly inclined to a peaceful solution, we were ready to defend ourselves fiercely if necessary" (Mahuad 2005, 189). The large-N empirical analyses in this chapter lend credence to the President's remarks by providing evidence of a more systematic, widespread relationship between the probability of being targeted and the selection of foreign policy advisors with hawkish foreign policy preferences. More

generally, these results indicate that theoretical arguments that take sub-leader individual actors (SLIAs) into account have the potential to increase our understanding of conflict processes and foreign policy. In the next chapter, I expand upon the explanation of strategic selection that I produced in this chapter and I propose and test some additional hypotheses.

CHAPTER 3
A HAWK FOR A HAWK

> The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince ... when you see the servant thinking more of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able to trust him.
>
> – Machiavelli, *The Prince, Chapter XXII.*

3.1 Introduction

When President-Elect George W. Bush introduced his Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, at a press conference shortly before his inauguration, he made it clear that one of his priorities when selecting a Secretary was to find someone who would vigorously pursue his own policy goals. For example, Bush remarked, "One of the things Secretary Rumsfeld will do is to work with our OMB director to make sure that the missile defense receives the priority we think it must receive in future Pentagon budgets" (Bush 2000). In response, Rumsfeld made it clear that he shared the same policy preferences as the President-elect, and that he would pursue those policies, claiming, "I have studied carefully your address and blue print for defense that you outlined at the Citadel, and I support it enthusiastically" (Rumsfeld 2000).

In this chapter, I continue my explanation of the selection of FPAs as part of a strategic decision-making process by the political leader. More specifically, I examine the principal-agent problem that arises whenever the political leader delegates foreign policy decisions to

other individuals, and I consider how these problems should affect the personal characteristics that political leaders select in their foreign and defense ministers.

I argue that leaders with hawkish foreign policy preferences will be more likely to have foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences, since leaders will purposefully select ministers who maximize the congruence between the policy preferences of the leader and their ministers, therefore maximizing the probability that the leaders' ministers will pursue the same foreign policies that are preferred by the political leader whenever they are delegated direct power over foreign policy. Furthermore, this effect should weaken whenever the leader does not have as much control over the selection of those ministers, specifically when the leader is the head of a coalition government in which the foreign affairs and defense portfolios have been awarded to different political parties.

I test these predictions using the European Representative Democracy (ERD) data set on cabinet formation in post-WWII Europe, as well as original data on the personal characteristics of the foreign and defense ministers in 29 countries between 1950 and 2000. Ordered probit analyses show moderate to strong support for the above predictions and provide further evidence that large-N empirical analyses of sub-leader individual actors (SLIAs) have the potential to vastly increase our understanding of conflict processes and foreign policy.

3.2 Delegation of Foreign Policy

"A minister has to keep his mouth shut; If he wants to open it, he has to resign."

– Jean-Pierre Chevenement (French Interior Minister, 1997-2000)

Principal-agent problems are ubiquitous in international relations. For example, Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell (2007) argue that sexual violence committed by police and military forces "is a category of human rights violation ... more likely to be attributable to the selfish

motivations of agents" and that such violence is more likely to occur during times of conflict when there are limitations on information and organization (Butler et al. 2007, 669). In their study of diversionary war, Downs and Rocke (1994) argue that a well-informed agent, fearing his/her removal from office, may initiate an unsuccessful war as part of a "gamble for resurrection." Rauchhaus (2009) examines the principal-agent problems that can arise during humanitarian interventions whenever an intervening country delegates reconstruction efforts to other domestic groups. The author shows that third parties "operating in weakly institutionalized environments may be unable to punish groups that take advantage of intervention" (Rauchhaus 2009, 871).

In chapter 2, I showed that inexperienced leaders use the selection of foreign and defense ministers to signal not only their own preferences, but that they are being influenced by more aggressive individuals, therefore lowering the probability that they are targeted in international crises. Leaders, however, are not merely influenced by their foreign and defense ministers. Because they cannot be around for every policy decision, they must delegate some amount of direct power over policy-making to other individuals within the foreign policy bureaucracy and cabinet. In other words, ministers – not the leader – are often making the decisions; not necessarily the decisions regarding conflict initiation, but decisions that could impact the likelihood that the minister's state or an opposing state initiates a conflict somewhere down the line. As Hermann and Preston (1994, 76) have observed: "Because the president participates in the selection of members of this organization and sets into place the norms and rules determining organizational culture, what the president is like can influence what the advisers are like and the way the organization tackles foreign policy issues."

Given dictatorial power, most leaders would pursue their own preferred policies, unless, of course, those preferred policies would cause the leader to be removed from power. But the delegation of policy decisions to other individual and/or group actors introduces uncertainty into the decision-making process by taking the decisions away from someone who is all

but guaranteed to pursue the leader's preferred policies (the leader) and into the hands of someone for whom the likelihood of pursuing the leader's preferred policies is equal to or less than that of the political leader.

Whenever a principal delegates a policy decision to an agent, the principal can increase the likelihood that that agent will carry out the principal's wishes by selecting an agent with similar policy preferences.[30] If leaders are rational actors and have at least some control over the selection of their agents, then I would expect less hawkish leaders to have agents with less hawkish foreign policy preferences, and more hawkish leaders to have agents with more hawkish foreign policy preferences.

Turning to specific individual actors within the leader's cabinet, I continue my examination of foreign and defense ministers that I began in the previous chapter. I assume that foreign and defense ministers are no different than political leaders, in that they should become more likely to pursue hawkish foreign policies (that is, more willing to use force and less willing to make concessions) as their innate preference for such policies increases. If leaders are rational actors and have at least some control over the selection of their foreign and defense ministers, then I would expect that leaders with more hawkish foreign policy preferences would select foreign and defense ministers with more hawkish foreign policy preferences, since those ministers can be counted upon to serve as more effective agents for a hawkish leader.

Although a leader's experience and hawkish preferences both decrease their willingness to make concessions (therefore decreasing the likelihood that the leader is targeted), I distinguish between a leader's experience and a leader's hawkish preferences when I consider how those variables should affect the leader's selection of foreign and defense ministers. Inexperienced leaders are more willing to make concessions due to domestic political pressures,

[30]This assumes that the principals and agents are rational actors and that, all else being equal, they will pursue their own preferred policies, unless doing so will result in the loss of power.

not because of any change in their preferred policies (Gelpi and Grieco 2001). But leaders who prefer hawkish foreign policies are less likely to make concessions during negotiations because those are their preferred policies. In other words, those are the policies that the leader would pursue if they were guaranteed to remain in power and did not face domestic political pressures.

This is an important distinction because it affects the predictions that I make regarding a leader's tenure and policy preferences (both of which affect their willingness to make concessions, but for different reasons) and the policy preferences of their foreign and defense ministers. For example, in chapter 2 I argued that leaders who are more likely to be targeted have a disproportionate need to signal aggression, and that inexperienced leaders, being more likely to be targeted because they are constrained by domestic political pressures to make additional concessions during negotiations (Gelpi and Grieco 2001), should be more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences in order to signal that, despite the leader's inexperience (which would otherwise make them more willing to make concessions), the leader is getting foreign policy advice from individuals whose personal characteristics make them prone to recommending more hawkish responses to external challenges.[31] This argument actually implies that leaders with *less* hawkish foreign policy preferences should be *more* likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences. However, the relationship between a leader's policy preferences and their minister's policy preferences should be based upon an argument involving the leader's policy preferences, not involving their ability to remain in power by avoiding external challenges, which serves as the basis for the argument connecting a leader's tenure to the hawkish preferences of their foreign and defense ministers (see chapter 2).

Leaders who care solely about remaining in power should be wary of appointing foreign

[31]This causal process is illustrated in figure 3.1 (an expanded version of figure 2.1) as the causal path, 6–7a–8a–9–3–4–5.



Figure 3.1: Individual Actors and International Conflict (expanded)

and defense ministers who prefer policies that are more hawkish than what is necessary to remain in power, since those ministers – whenever they are delegated a foreign policy decision – will carry out a more hawkish decision than that preferred by the political leader. Conversely, a leader who prefers hawkish foreign policies for reasons that have nothing to do with remaining in power will prefer that their ministers make more hawkish decisions, since the leader cares less about remaining in power and more about achieving their preferred policies.[32] I propose the following hypotheses:

> ***Hypothesis 1***: A leader's hawkish foreign policy preferences have a positive effect on the probability that the leader selects a foreign minister with hawkish foreign policy preferences.

> ***Hypothesis 2***: A leader's hawkish foreign policy preferences have a positive effect on the probability that the leader selects a defense minister with hawkish foreign policy preferences.

Whether political leaders would prefer to have ministers who maximize the congruence between the leader's and minister's policy preferences (therefore maximizing the likelihood with which the leader achieves their preferred policies) is irrelevant if the leader does not control the selection of the foreign and defense ministers. I posit that whenever leaders do not have as much control over the selection of their foreign and defense ministers, the relationship between the leader's policy preferences and those of their foreign and defense ministers should weaken.

If a leader is in charge of their political party and the leader's party is in power, then the leader should have at least some say in the selection of their state's foreign and defense ministers. In that sense, there should not necessarily be that much difference between

[32]This is an abbreviated version of the argument made in chapter 2 regarding the marginal effect of a leader's tenure on the hawkish preferences of their foreign and defense ministers as the leader's own hawkish preferences increase. See the discussion of Hypotheses 2 and 2a in chapter 2, section 2.2.

democracies and dictatorships when it comes to the ability of the political leader to appoint foreign and defense ministers with similar policy preferences.[33] An exception can be found in parliamentary democracies when there is a coalition government and the foreign and defense portfolios are awarded to a political party other than that of the political leader, in which case the political leader can no longer use the selection of those ministers to ensure that their preferred policies are carried out, and when leaders do not have as much control over the selection of their foreign and defense ministers, I would not expect the policy preferences of the political leader – or any personal characteristic of the political leader that affects their policy preferences – to have as much impact on the policy preferences of the foreign and defense ministers.[34]

Even when the leader controls the selection of the foreign affairs and defense portfolios, the leader sometimes awards those portfolios to individuals from other parties (e.g. Barack Obama appointing Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense in 2009). But we can explain those decisions as being a function of the leader's own personal characteristics upon entering office. In chapter 2, for example, I noted that because Barack Obama was inexperienced in 2009 (as any new leader would be), he represented a more appealing target to other countries. Obama did not simply appoint a Republican to be his Secretary of Defense in 2009. He appointed someone who was much older and had served in the military – the kind of person who would signal that Obama was being advised by someone aggressive, who would advise a more hawkish response to external challenges. Had Obama been forced to allow the Republican party to select the Secretary of Defense, he would not have been able to use the selection of the Secretary of Defense to help alleviate the effect that his inexperience

[33]There are, of course, some constraints that the leaders of democracies must confront that dictators do not. For example, President Obama must select Secretaries of State and Defense that can pass confirmation by the U.S. Senate.

[34]This part of the theoretical argument is generalizable. Any personal characteristic of the political leader that affects their policy preferences should affect the personal characteristics that they select in their cabinet members. Furthermore, these relationships should weaken whenever the leader has less control over the selection of those cabinet members.

had on the likelihood the the U.S. was targeted by other countries.[35] I propose the following hypotheses:

> ***Hypothesis 1a***: The marginal effect of a leader's hawkish foreign policy preferences on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of their foreign minister is positive regardless of regime type; the effect is weakest when the leader is the head of a coalition government in which the foreign affairs portfolio has been awarded to a different political party.

> ***Hypothesis 2a***: The marginal effect of a leader's hawkish foreign policy preferences on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of their defense minister is positive regardless of regime type; the effect is weakest when the leader is the head of a coalition government in which the defense portfolio has been awarded to a different political party.

[35]This means that in 2009, Obama's inexperience made him more likely to select hawks, while his dovishness made him more likely to select doves. Given that he appears to have selected ministers with hawkish preferences, the question becomes: Why did Barack Obama's inexperience win out over his dovish preferences? It is more useful to look at President Obama's personal characteristics from a probability standpoint, not just as they apply to the likelihood that Obama selects ministers with hawkish preferences, but on the likelihood that Obama selects ministers with hawkish preferences relative to leaders with other combinations of inexperience and hawkish preferences.

Recall that in chapter 2 I predicted that the relationship between leaders' inexperience and the likelihood of selecting foreign and defense ministers with hawkish preferences would diminish as the leader's own hawkish preferences increased. Therefore, I expect that inexperienced leaders with hawkish preferences and experienced leaders with hawkish preferences should have a similar probability of selecting hawkish ministers, since the effect from leaders' inexperience diminishes as the leader's hawkish preferences increase. Furthermore, because inexperience and hawkish preferences each have a positive effect on the likelihood that a leader selects hawkish ministers, I do not expect to find a significant difference between inexperienced leaders with dovish preferences and inexperienced leaders with hawkish preferences, since the leader's hawkish preferences are there to "take the place" of the leader's inexperience as the leader's hawkish preferences increase and cause the effect of leaders' inexperience to diminish. My theoretical arguments suggest that experienced leaders with dovish preferences will have the lowest probability of selecting ministers with hawkish preferences.

3.3 Research Design

To test Hypotheses 1, 1a, 2, and 2a, I use the same general setup that I use to test Hypotheses 2 and 2a in chapter 2. The differences include a more limited spatial-temporal domain – I observe the population of newly-formed governments in post-WWII Europe – and a statistical model that is estimated separately for the foreign and defense ministers, since it is possible that only one of those portfolios will be awarded to a political party other than the political leader's party whenever a coalition government is formed. I draw 370 observations from the European Representative Democracy (ERD) data set (Andersson and Ersson 2012).

The dependent variables are the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the foreign and defense ministers in a particular government. In both models, the primary independent variable is the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the political leader. There are several personal characteristics that have been shown to increase an individual's innate hawkishness that leaders could select in their foreign and defense ministers in order to ensure that their ministers will pursue the same policies that are preferred by the political leader. For example, Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005) argue that an individual's time horizons become shorter as they grow older, causing them to care less about remaining in power and more about taking risky behaviors that will maximize their ability to affect change in world politics, certainly moreso than an individual who cared solely about remaining in power. The authors' empirical analyses show that a leader's age has a positive effect on the probability that their state initiates militarized disputes (Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005). Horowitz and Stam (2010) argue that individuals who have served in the military are more hawkish than those who have not served in the military, although the effect is weaker if an individual not only served, but saw combat. Empirical analyses show that a leader's military service has a positive effect on the probability that their state initiates militarized disputes (Horowitz and Stam 2010). Koch and Fulton (2011) argue that females – once they attain an executive

position – are more aggressive than their male counterparts, due to the conditioning that they receive during their struggle to overcome gender biases and attain their positions. The authors' empirical analyses show that countries with female leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers tend to have higher defense budgets and increased conflict behavior.[36]

Leaders could select foreign and defense ministers according to their age, military service, and gender if they wanted to increase the congruence between their own foreign policy preferences and the innate preferences of their ministers, therefore increasing the likelihood that their ministers will pursue the same policies that are preferred by the leader. A leader with personal characteristics that have been shown to increase an individual's innate hawkishness will be more likely to appoint foreign and defense ministers with similar personal characteristics. For example, older leaders should appoint older foreign and defense ministers, since those individuals will have had their policy preferences affected in a manner similar to the political leader, and will be more likely to act according to the leader's wishes. Conversely, younger leaders (who care more about staying in office than about taking aggressive actions that may or may not be necessary to remain in office) should appoint younger foreign and defense ministers, since those ministers will care primarily about staying in office, and ministers who care primarily about remaining in office can be counted upon to pursue the preferred policies of a leader who cares primarily about remaining in office. All of this suggests a positive relationship between the age of the political leader and the age of his/her foreign and defense ministers, and, more generally, between the policy preferences of the political leader and the policy preference of his/her ministers (more specifically, between personal characteristics of the political leader that affect their innate hawkish foreign policy preferences and the same personal characteristics of their foreign and defense ministers).

For each newly-formed government, I code variables for the age, military service, and

[36]This effect is dependent somewhat on the number of females in a country's legislature (Koch and Fulton 2011).

gender of the leader, foreign minister, and defense minister. With the exception of military service, the data on political leaders was already available in the latest incarnation of the Archigos data set (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). As part of my dissertation research, I have collected the necessary data on foreign and defense ministers, as well as the data on the military service of political leaders. For more information on the data collection process, see chapter 2, section 2.3. The variables, *Leader Age*, *Foreign Minister Age*, and *Defense Minister Age*, indicate the age (in years) of the individual appointed to each position during the year of investiture. The variables, *Leader Female*, *Foreign Minister Female*, and *Defense Minister Female*, are binary, and indicate whether or not the individual serving in each position is female (=1). The variables, *Leader Military*, *Foreign Minister Military*, and *Defense Minister Military*, are also binary, and indicate whether or not an individual served in their country's military (=1) prior to attaining their position.

Because age, military service, and gender all have a similar effect on an individual's innate hawkishness, I operationalize the hawkish foreign policy preferences of each individual actor as an additive index with a 3-point scale: the variables, *Leader Hawkish Preferences*, *Foreign Minister Hawkish Preferences*, and *Defense Minister Hawkish Preferences*.[37] Similar to the procedures followed in chapter 2, an individual receives one point if they are over 60 years old during the year of investiture, one point if they are female, and one point if they served in the military prior to attaining their position.[38]

I expect that a leader with just one characteristic that increases an individual's personal hawkishness – who is older, has served in the military, or is female (in the case of political leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers) – will be more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with any one of those characteristics. I expect that a leader with any two

[37]Females have only been shown to exhibit more hawkish behavior than their male counterparts when they have gained an executive position, which is indeed the case for the leader, foreign minister, and defense minister (Koch and Fulton 2011).

[38]The exact cut-off year for age is arbitrary. But it is necessary to transform an individual's age into a binary variable so that age is not weighted heavier than military service and gender.

of those characteristics would be even more likely to select a foreign and defense minister with any one of those characteristics, since an individual's age, gender, and military service all have a similar effect on their policy preferences. In other words, they all have a positive effect on that individual's hawkish foreign policy preferences.

Because one of the components of a leader's hawkish preferences – their age – is strongly correlated with the same component of their foreign and defense ministers' hawkish preferences (since everyone ages at the same rate), hawkish leaders will naturally appear to select hawkish ministers if one does not control for their time in office. For example, if a leader selects a certain individual to serve as foreign minister, and then a new government is formed 5 years later, and the leader retains the same individual as foreign minister, the actors will both have a higher personal hawkishness score when the second government is formed (since they will have both aged 5 years), and one might erroneously conclude that more hawkish leaders tend to select more hawkish foreign ministers. This problem is ameliorated by controlling for each actor's time in office. Therefore, I constructed variables for the time in office of each actor. The variables, *Leader Tenure*, *Foreign Minister Tenure*, and *Defense Minister Tenure*, indicate the number of years that a leader, foreign minister, or defense minister has served in their position prior to a particular government being formed. Descriptive statistics for the personal characteristics of each individual actor are provided in appendix A (table A.9).

I hypothesized that the marginal effect of a leader's hawkish preferences on the hawkish preferences of their foreign and defense ministers would be positive regardless of regime type, but weakest whenever the leader was the head of a coalition government in which the foreign affairs or defense portfolios had been awarded to a different political party (H1a and H2a). To test these hypotheses, I constructed the variables, *Foreign Affairs Portfolio* and *Defense Portfolio*. For each newly-formed government, the variables are coded 1 if the relevant portfolio was awarded to the leader's party, 0 otherwise. In table 3.1, I provide an

Table 3.1: Austrian Governments, 1970-1995

Government	Year	Parties	Foreign Portfolio	Defense Portfolio	Leader Hawk	F.M. Hawk	D.M. Hawk
Kreisky I	1970	SPO	1	1	0	1	1
Kreisky II	1971	SPO	1	1	1	1	1
Kreisky III	1975	SPO	1	1	1	1	2
Kreisky IV	1979	SPO	1	1	1	0	1
Sinowatz	1983	SPO, FPO	1	0	0	0	0
Vranitzky I	1986	SPO, FPO	1	0	0	0	0
Vranitzky II	1987	SPO, OVP	0	0	0	0	0
Vranitzky III	1990	SPO, OVP	0	0	0	0	0
Vranitzky IV	1994	SPO, OVP	0	0	0	1	0

example of how the data was coded. Of the 370 observations that I draw from the European Representative Democracy (ERD) data set (Andersson and Ersson 2012), 232 observations saw the formation of a coalition government (approximately 63%). For the 232 observations in which a coalition government was formed, the leader's political party was awarded the foreign affairs portfolio 94 times (in approximately 45% of the observations in which a coalition government was formed), and the defense portfolio 102 times (in approximately 49% of the observations in which a coalition government was formed).

Hypotheses 1 and 1a require that I interact the variables *Leader Hawkish Preferences* and *Foreign Affairs Portfolio* and estimate the following statistical model:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Foreign Minister Hawkish Preferences} = b_0 \quad & + b_1\text{*Leader Hawkish Preferences} \\ & + b_2\text{*Foreign Affairs Portfolio} \\ & + b_3\text{*Leader Hawkish Preferences *} \\ & \qquad \text{Foreign Affairs Portfolio} \\ & + b_4 ... b_n\text{*Controls} + \epsilon \text{ [Equation 1]}\end{aligned}$$

Hypotheses 2 and 2a require that I interact the variables *Leader Hawkish Preferences* and *Defense Portfolio* and estimate the following statistical model:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Defense Minister Hawkish Preferences} = b_0 \quad & + b_1\text{*Leader Hawkish Preferences} \\ & + b_2\text{*Defense Portfolio} \\ & + b_3\text{*Leader Hawkish Preferences *} \\ & \qquad \text{Defense Portfolio} \\ & + b_4 ... b_n\text{*Controls} + \epsilon \text{ [Equation 2]}\end{aligned}$$

I control for several variables that might affect the leader's ability to select their own foreign and defense ministers and should therefore be included in the statistical model in order to decrease the likelihood of omitted variable bias. The variable, *Post Election*, is binary, and

coded 1 if the newly-formed government was formed after an election, 0 otherwise (say, due to a change in party composition). The variable, *Coalition Cabinet*, is binary, and coded 1 if the newly-formed government includes multiple political parties, 0 otherwise. The variable, *Number of Ministers*, indicates the total number of ministers that comprise each government. The variable, *Number of Parties*, indicates the total number of parties that comprise each government. The variable, *Cabinet Control*, measures the total amount of control that a prime minister has over the rest of the cabinet. It is measured as a discrete, ordinal scale from 1-7, in which the prime minister is awarded 1 point for each of the following criteria: (1) the prime minister has the right to appoint (2) and dismiss the other cabinet members; (3) cabinet members can only be dismissed if the prime minister is also dismissed and a new government is formed; (4) the prime minister can decide ministry jurisdiction; (5) the prime minister has steering (or *co-coordinating*) rights over the other cabinet members; (6) the prime minister has control over the cabinet agenda; and (7) majority voting rules apply to decision-making (rather than a requirement that all decisions be unanimous) (Bergman, Muller, Strom, and Blomgren 2003).

3.4 Results and Discussion

Due to the discrete, ordinal nature of the dependent variables, ordered probit is an appropriate choice when estimating the statistical models in equations 1 and 2. I begin with the foreign minister. First, I estimate an abbreviated version of the statistical model in equation 1 with only the primary independent variable, *Leader Hawkish Preferences*. Then I estimate the full statistical model in equation 1, including the interaction term, *Leader Hawkish Preferences * Foreign Affairs Portfolio*, as well as the control variables. The results are shown in table 3.3.

From a substantive standpoint, the statistics in the first two rows provide the most

Table 3.2: Parameter Expectations for the Hawkish Preferences of the Foreign and Defense Ministers

Regressor	*Expectation*
Leader Hawkish Preferences	+
Leader Hawkish Preferences * Foreign Affairs Portfolio	+
Leader Hawkish Preferences * Defense Portfolio	+

important results. The coefficient for the variable, *Leader Hawkish Preferences*, is positive and statistically significant in the first model, suggesting that hawkish leaders are indeed more likely to select foreign ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences. The variable loses its statistical significance when I interact it with the variable indicating whether or not the foreign affairs portfolio was awarded to the leader's political party. But this is expected. In the second model, the interaction term, *Leader Hawkish Preferences * Foreign Affairs Portfolio*, is both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that there is an upward shift in the effect from leaders' hawkishness upon the hawkishness of their foreign minister when the leader has more control over the selection of their foreign ministers (table 3.3, model 2). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1a.

I follow similar procedures when examining defense ministers. First, I estimate an abbreviated version of the statistical model in equation 2 with only the primary independent variable, *Leader Hawkish Preferences*. Then I estimate the full statistical model, including the interaction term, *Leader Hawkish Preferences * Defense Portfolio*, and the control variables. The results are shown in table 3.4.

From a substantive standpoint, the statistics in the first two rows provide the most important results. The coefficient for the variable, *Leader Hawkish Preferences*, is positive and

Table 3.3: Ordered Probit Analysis of the Hawkish Preferences of The Foreign Minister (1950-2000)

	(1)	(2)
Leader Hawkish Preferences *0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness*	.2499***	-.0345
	(.0919)	(.1565)
Leader Hawkish Preferences * Foreign Affairs Portfolio *interaction*		.3577**
		(.1863)
Foreign Affairs Portfolio *dummy, 1 = The foreign affairs portfolio was awarded to the leader's party*		.1104
		(.1933)
Leader Tenure *Number of years that the political leader has served in that position*	-.0326**	-.0362**
	(.0163)	(.0181)
Foreign Minister Tenure *Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position*	.0907***	.1129***
	(.0169)	(.0193)
Cabinet Control *0 = Little Control, 7 = Significant Control*		-2.78e-06
		(6.96e-06)
Post-Election *dummy, 1 = The government was formed immediately following an election*		.1670
		(.1461)
Coalition Government *dummy, 1 = The government includes multiple political parties*		1.17e-05**
		(5.24e-06)
Number of Parties *The number of parties included in the government*		4.99e-06
		(5.48e-06)
Number of Ministers *The number of individuals serving as cabinet members*		.0878***
		(.0156)
Cut Point 1	.5886	2.398
	(.1009)	(.3795)
Cut Point 2	1.755	3.738
	(.1322)	(.4037)
Observations	355	342
Log pseudolikelihood	-290.64	-257.78

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

statistically significant in both model specifications in table 3.4, indicating a more consistent effect from leaders' hawkish preferences upon the preferences of the defense minister (table 3.4, models 1-2) than on the preferences of the foreign minister (table 3.3, models 1-2). Indeed, the relationship does not diminish when I include the interaction term, *Leader Hawkish Preferences * Defense Portfolio*, which is intended to account for the possibility

Table 3.4: Ordered Probit Analysis of the Hawkish Preferences of The Defense Minister (1950-2000)

	(1)	(2)
Leader Hawkish Preferences *0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness*	.4399*** (.0901)	.4943*** (.1519)
Leader Hawkish Preferences * Defense Portfolio *interaction*		-.0483 (.1730)
Defense Portfolio *dummy; 1 = The defense portfolio was awarded to the leader's party*		.0073 (.2209)
Leader Tenure *Number of years that the political leader has served in that position*	-.0535*** (.0164)	-.0606*** (.0175)
Defense Minister Tenure *Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position*	.0864** (.0327)	.0758** (.0338)
Cabinet Control *0 = Prime Minister has Little Control, 7 = Significant Control*		-4.36e-05*** (3.22e-06)
Post-Election *dummy, 1 = The government was formed immediately following an election*		.0060 (.1414)
Coalition Government *dummy, 1 = The government includes multiple political parties*		7.89e-06* (4.34e-06)
Number of Parties *The number of parties included in the government*		-.1027* (.0605)
Number of Ministers *The number of individuals serving as cabinet members*		.0123 (.0158)
Cut Point 1	.5178 (.1008)	.5103 (.3543)
Cut Point 2	2.194 (.1767)	2.226 (.3622)
Observations	349	338
Log pseudolikelihood	-257.57	-241.39

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

that a leader's preferences might have less impact on the preferences of the defense minister when the defense portfolio is awarded to a different political party, presumably decreasing the control that the leader exercises over the selection of their defense minister. These results are robust to alternative modeling strategies, such as ordered logistic regression (see table A.11 in appendix A).

I should note that the results in tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide additional support for Hypothesis 2 in the previous chapter. Recall that I hypothesized in chapter 2 that a leader's time in office would have a negative effect on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of their foreign and defense ministers. In tables 3.3 and 3.4, the coefficient for leaders' tenure is consistently negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a leader's tenure has a negative effect on the hawkish foreign policy preferences of their foreign and defense ministers (tables 3.3 and 3.4, models 1-2). This serves as a usefulness robustness check for the analyses in chapter 2 by showing that the effect from leaders' tenure on the policy preferences of their foreign and defense ministers manifests even when the sample is limited to post-WWII European parliamentary democracies.

To better illustrate the interactive relationship between a leader's policy preferences and the preferences of their foreign and defense ministers, I graph the change in the marginal effect from leaders' hawkish preferences upon the hawkish preferences of their foreign minister (figure 3.2, top), and defense minister (figure 3.2, bottom), as the relevant portfolio is either awarded or not awarded to the leader's political party. I estimate the full statistical models in equations 1 and 2 and use procedures recommended by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). 90% confidence intervals are shown as dashed lines.

Consistent with the results in table 3.3, the effect from leaders' hawkish preferences upon the hawkish preferences of their foreign minister shifts upward when the foreign affairs portfolio is awarded to the leader's political party, suggesting that leaders – when they are awarded the opportunity – will select foreign ministers with similar policy preferences in order to ensure that their ministers will pursue the same policies that are preferred by the political leader (figure 3.2, top). Consistent with the results in table 3.4, the effect from leaders' hawkish preferences upon the hawkish preferences of their defense minister appears to be positive and statistically significant regardless of whether the defense portfolio was awarded to the leader's political party (figure 3.2, bottom).



Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of Leaders' Hawkishness on the Hawkishness of their Foreign Minister (Top) and Defense Minister (Bottom)

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I continued my explanation of the strategic selection of foreign policy advisors that I began in the previous chapter. I used ordered probit analyses of original data on the personal characteristics of the foreign and defense ministers in 370 newly-formed governments in post-WWII Europe to show that 1) hawkish leaders are more likely to have hawkish defense ministers, and 2) a leader's hawkishness has more effect on the hawkishness of their foreign minister when the foreign affairs portfolio has been awarded to the leader's political party. In the next chapter, I discuss the results of an original, web-based experiment conducted in the U.S. and India that provides more direct evidence of some of the causal mechanisms described throughout chapters 2 and 3.

CHAPTER 4

RISK ACCEPTANCE, PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT, AND THE DELEGATION OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

4.1 Introduction

The use of experimental methods in exploring the causal mechanisms of international relations theories is no longer a rare event. To give a few recent examples, Kertzer and McGraw (2012) run a laboratory experiment in which they manipulate the amount of information available to survey respondents regarding international conflicts. They find that individuals react to fear – but not uncertainty – in the way that realists suggest that they should.[39] In similar work, Garcia-Retamero, Mueller, and Rousseau (2012) use experimental methods to show that individuals are less likely to view other countries as military threats when they perceive that the other country has similar values (both politically and economically). Finally, Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013) examine individual attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. The authors find that American citizens are not adamantly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons. Rather, Americans only oppose the use of nuclear weapons when they fear that doing so will set a precedent that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons against the United States in the future (Press, Sagan, and Valentino 2013).

[39]Considering the extent to which realists view uncertainty and fear as somewhat synonymous (Rathbun 2007), the fact that individuals react differently to the emotion of fear and the presence of uncertainty is an important result.

Whether they are utilizing observational or experimental methods, among the many issues that social scientists must address during the research design process are those of internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to the extent to which a study is capable of producing clear evidence of the causal mechanisms described throughout the theoretical argument, while external validity refers to the extent to which the empirical methods used by the researcher allow that researcher to make inferences beyond the test, or, the "extent to which results from a study can be generalized beyond the particular study" (de Vaus 2001, 28).

In the previous chapters, I make hypotheses on political leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers that I test using observational data on actual political leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers. This makes the external validity of those analyses rather strong. In fact, given that external validity refers to the ability to make inferences beyond the test, and that I utilize data on the leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers of nearly every country, the empirical analyses in previous chapters (particularly chapter 2) come close to the point where there is no "beyond the test" (the rough nature of my proxy for hawkish foreign policy preferences aside). Because the data set only covers the period from 1950 to 2000, my ability to make inferences beyond that time period relies on the assumption that there is no inherent difference between individuals who served as political leader, foreign minister, and defense minister during the period from 1950 to 2000, and individuals who served in similar capacities during other time periods. That said, the fact that I do not rely on a group of college students in a computer lab who I assume will act, think, and respond in the same manner as political leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers means that the external validity of those analyses is quite strong.

Conversely, the internal validity of the analyses in chapters 2 and 3 is rather weak, since I make assumptions about the effect of personal characteristics upon individual behavior that are not clearly revealed in the observational data. For example, although I have shown that,

controlling for both actors' time in office, an older leader prefers to have an older foreign minister, I have not necessarily shown that a leader who prefers more risky foreign policy decisions prefers to delegate decisions to a foreign minister who prefers more risky foreign policy decisions, which is the crux of the theoretical argument in chapter 3. An experimental analysis could help bolster the results in the previous chapters by providing more direct evidence of some of the causal mechanisms described throughout chapters 2 and 3 than the observational analyses can provide. To that end, I use this chapter to discuss the results of a web-based experiment that I ran from October 18-20, 2012 using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk).

4.2 The Survey

4.2.1 Signaling Aggression

In chapter 2, I hypothesized that states whose leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers had more hawkish foreign policy preferences would be targeted less often by other states, since those individuals preferred more aggressive responses to external challenges and would therefore be perceived as being costlier targets. I also hypothesized that inexperienced leaders would be more likely to select hawkish foreign and defense ministers due to the increased likelihood that those leaders have of being targeted (and the increased need that they have to signal that they were being advised by hawkish individuals). The crucial mechanism here is the perception of threat. When a leader perceives a higher likelihood that their state will be threatened, therefore decreasing the probability that the leader will be able to remain in office, they should become more likely to use the selection of foreign policy advisors to signal that they are receiving hawkish advice. Therefore, the first part of the experiment gauges whether survey respondents who are manipulated into feeling threatened prefer to have more hawkish foreign policy advisors.

Survey respondents were randomly assigned to read one of two paragraphs, each containing a scenario in which the respondent was the leader of their country and could select one person to accompany them to any negotiations with countries that were considering attacking their country. One paragraph, however, implied that there was a particularly high probability that the respondent's country was going to be attacked within the next year, and that such attacks would seriously threaten the survey respondent's ability to remain political leader.

This scenario is based on a study by Gelpi and Grieco (2001), who argued that inexperienced leaders are more likely than experienced leaders to offer concessions during negotiations due to the increased domestic political pressure that they face to avoid costly conflicts, therefore increasing the probability that they are targeted by other states. Although the authors acknowledge that inexperienced leaders will occasionally benefit from successfully resisting an international crisis (as opposed to offering concessions), the net utility of resistance "entails the possibility of both costs and benefits for democratic leaders," which can be particularly consequential for inexperienced leaders who have not yet established a strong reputation for competence among their own people (Gelpi and Grieco 2001, 798). The two paragraphs are provided below:

> **One:** "Imagine that you are the [President / Prime Minister] of [the United States / India]. You have been in office for 7 years and have developed a strong reputation as a competent leader. Even if [the United States / India] were targeted with a destructive attack within the next 12 months, it would not have a significant effect on your approval ratings because of your established reputation. Moreover, the probability that [the U.S. / India] will be targeted with a destructive attack within the next 12 months is very low. You can select one person to advise you on how to respond to potential threats and to accompany you to negotiations with any countries that are considering attacking your country. Below are descriptions of two potential advisors."

Two: "Imagine that you have recently been inaugurated as [President / Prime Minister] of [the United States / India] and are therefore in charge of responding to potential military threats against [the U.S. / India]. There is a high probability that [the U.S. / India] will be attacked within the next 12 months. This attack is likely to be very destructive and result in the deaths of over one thousand [U.S. / Indian] citizens. Unfortunately, you have not yet established a strong reputation, and your approval ratings are likely to drop precipitously if your country is targeted with a destructive attack. You can select one person to advise you on how to respond to potential threats and to accompany you to negotiations with any countries that are considering attacking your country. Below are descriptions of two potential advisors."

Although there are two variables being manipulated in the above paragraphs (the survey respondent's time in office and the threat of attack), I believe that survey respondents are unlikely to be affected by any variation in the amount of time that they have served in office. Instead they are more likely to respond to manipulations in the probability with which they will be attacked by other countries, and the extent to which those attacks will threaten their ability to remain in office. To account for the possibility that the presence of multiple manipulations threatens my ability to infer that variation in the level of threat (which is the causal mechanism from chapter 2 that I am trying to examine) accounts for any change in survey respondents' feelings towards potential advisors, I measure the extent to which survey respondents view the world as dangerous (that is, I measure survey respondents' innate perceptions of threat) and examine whether respondents who believe in a more dangerous world are more likely to view aggression as a desirable trait in potential advisors.

After reading one of the above paragraphs, the respondent was shown a single picture of a computer-generated male face with a randomized level of dominant facial features (Oosterhof and Todorov 2008). Some examples are provided in figures 4.1 and 4.2 on the next page.[40]

[40]Faces were generated using FaceGen software; www.facegen.com

Regardless of the level of dominant facial features in the face that a respondent was shown, each respondent was provided the same description to read below the randomized face, so that the only variable being manipulated was the level of dominant facial features in the face. I inserted the common description below each face in order to decrease the probability that the survey respondent would realize that the facial features were being manipulated. The common description was as follows: "This man served as a foreign policy advisor to three different [Presidents / Prime Ministers]. Before entering government, he also served in the armed forces, earning two medals for bravery and valor." Respondents were asked how they would feel about having this person as their foreign policy advisor. They were also asked about the general utility of having someone aggressive accompany them to negotiations with opposing countries.



Figure 4.1: Less Aggressive Face

Figure 4.2: More Aggressive Face

Recent experimental work lends some support to the argument that survey respondents who feel threatened will prefer to surround themselves with people who appear aggressive. Spisak (2012) manipulates the faces of hypothetical presidential candidates to appear older or younger and finds that older looking candidates receive an increase in public support during times of war. Similarly, I argue that leaders who perceive an increased likelihood of

external challenges – such as inexperienced leaders – will be more likely to select foreign and defense ministers who will be perceived as aggressive by other countries.

I asked survey respondents for basic information about themselves, including their age, gender, education, military service, combat experience, political ideology, and number of children. I also included an instructional manipulation check at the end of the survey in order to isolate those respondents who were more likely to have actually read the treatment paragraphs in the first part of the survey. Survey respondents who did not correctly answer the IMC question had their responses dropped from the data set (as recommend by Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009). The full questionnaire, IRB approval form, and informed consent form are provided in appendix B.

4.2.2 A Hawk for a Hawk

In chapter 3, I hypothesized that political leaders with hawkish foreign policy preferences would be more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences, since those leaders will want to ensure that their foreign and defense ministers, whenever they are exercising any direct power that they have been given, will pursue the same policies that are preferred by the political leader. More generally, I expect that whenever someone is forced to delegate a policy decision to another individual, they will prefer to delegate those decisions to individuals with similar preferences (just as voters in a representative democracy tend to vote for candidates with similar political stances). In chapter 3, I tested this argument by showing that leaders with personal characteristics that previous research had shown to increase an individual's hawkish foreign policy preferences tended to select foreign and defense ministers with similar characteristics. The second part of the experiment will provide more direct support for the theoretical argument in chapter 3 by gauging whether survey respondents who are in fact more aggressive prefer to delegate decisions concerning international conflict to more aggressive agents.

First, I gauged the risk acceptance of survey respondents by asking the following question:

> "Now imagine that you are given control over your country's military and are afforded the opportunity to initiate a military conflict against another country. Your country has a very low probability of winning that conflict, but the potential rewards from victory are enormous. How likely are you to initiate that conflict?"

Respondents answered on a scale from 1-5, where 1 was "Not likely at all" and 5 was "Extremely likely."

Next, I asked respondents to choose someone to make that decision for them (concerning the risky conflict in the above question). Respondents were asked to choose between two potential decision-makers with a randomized age, gender, and level of military service. They were also asked about the general utility of selecting a decision-maker who was aggressive, with the assumption being that respondents with higher levels of risk acceptance would be more likely to answer that it was important to select a decision-maker who was aggressive.

4.3 Results and Discussion

I collected 106 survey responses in the U.S. and 103 survey responses in India. Survey respondents in the U.S. ranged from 16 years old to 71 years old, were evenly split between male and female, and reported an average political ideology of 5 on a scale from 1-10. Nearly every survey respondent in the U.S. indicated that they possessed a college degree. Approximately 10% of survey respondents reported that they had served in the military and, of those respondents, 20% had seen combat during their military service.

In India, survey respondents were quite a bit younger (with an average age of 29) and were much more likely to be male and to have served in the military. Survey respondents in India reported a more conservative political ideology (with an average score of 6.9 on a scale

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Survey Respondents in the U.S. and India

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
U.S. (106 respondents)				
Age *in years*	36.27	13.39	16	71
Gender *0 = Male, 1 = Female*	.4528	.5001	0	1
Education *1 = No Education ... 4 = University Degree*	3.585	.6305	1	4
Military *0 = Has never served ... 1 = Has served*	.0849	.2801	0	1
Ideology *1 = Left ... 10 = Right*	4.934	2.277	1	10
India (103 respondents)				
Age *in years*	28.91	7.849	18	59
Gender *0 = Male, 1 = Female*	.3689	.4849	0	1
Education *1 = No Education ... 4 = University Degree*	3.913	.3164	2	4
Military *0 = Has never served ... 1 = Has served*	.1650	.3730	0	1
Ideology *1 = Left ... 10 = Right*	6.903	1.988	1	10

from 1-10), and were slightly more likely to possess a college degree. Descriptive statistics are provided in table 4.1.

4.3.1 Signaling Aggression

I gauged whether survey respondents who were manipulated into feeling threatened were more likely to prefer a hawkish foreign policy advisor. 107 survey respondents were randomly

selected to read the following, less threatening paragraph:

> "Even if [the United States / India] were targeted with a destructive attack within the next 12 months, it would not have a significant effect on your approval ratings because of your established reputation ... You can select one person to advise you on how to respond to potential threats and to accompany you to negotiations with any countries that are considering attacking your country."

These respondents were then shown a picture of a hypothetical foreign policy advisor with a randomized level of dominant facial features. Shown below is the distribution of responses to the question – "How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor? – for respondents who saw the less aggressive face, and respondents who saw the more aggressive face.

Not Good At All	1	2.00%
Not Too Good	4	8.00%
Somewhat Good	15	30.00%
Very Good	21	42.00%
Extremely Good	9	18.00%



Not Good At All	2	3.51%
Not Too Good	7	12.28%
Somewhat Good	16	28.07%
Very Good	25	43.86%
Extremely Good	7	12.28%

For survey respondents who read the less threatening paragraph, there was no statistically significant and positive change in their feelings towards a potential advisor when that advisor had more dominant facial features. In fact, survey respondents who were randomly selected to read the less threatening paragraph experienced an approximate .15 decrease in the average answer that they gave to the question, "How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor?" when they were shown the face with more dominant facial features.[41]

The other 102 survey respondents were randomly selected to read the following, more threatening paragraph:

> "There is a high probability that [the U.S. / India] will be attacked within the next 12 months ... You have not yet established a strong reputation, and your approval ratings are likely to drop precipitously if your country is targeted with a destructive attack. You can select one person to advise you on how to respond to potential threats and to accompany you to negotiations with any countries that are considering attacking your country."

These respondents were then shown a picture of a hypothetical foreign policy advisor with a randomized level of dominant facial features. Shown on the next page is the distribution of responses to the question – "How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor? – for respondents who saw the less aggressive face, and respondents who saw the more aggressive face.

[41] On a scale from 1-5, where 1 is not good at all and 5 is extremely good, survey respondents who read the less threatening paragraph had an average response of 3.66 to the question when shown the less aggressive face, and 3.49 when shown the more aggressive face.

Not Good At All	3	5.45%
Not Too Good	4	7.27%
Somewhat Good	16	29.09%
Very Good	23	41.82%
Extremely Good	9	16.36%



Not Good At All	0	0.00%
Not Too Good	2	4.26%
Somewhat Good	14	29.79%
Very Good	26	55.32%
Extremely Good	5	10.64%

For survey respondents who were randomly selected to read the more threatening paragraph, there was an approximate .20 increase in the average answer that respondents gave to the question, "How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor?" when they were shown the potential advisor with more dominant facial features.[42] In other words, survey respondents who were manipulated into feeling threatened felt better about having an advisor who appeared aggressive.

To further examine this trend, I ran an OLS regression using survey respondents' answers to the question, "How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor?" as the dependent variable, with higher values indicating higher levels of favorability. The independent variable, *Dominant Face*, is binary, and coded 1 if the respondent was shown the potential advisor with more dominant facial features, 0 otherwise. I interact

[42]On a scale from 1-5, where 1 is not good at all and 5 is extremely good, survey respondents who read the more threatening paragraph had an average response of 3.56 to the question when shown the less aggressive face, and 3.72 when shown the more aggressive face.

this variable with the variable, *Threatening Manipulation*, which is also binary, and coded 1 if the respondent read the more threatening paragraph, 0 otherwise. If individuals who perceive higher levels of threat from other countries feel better about selecting someone who appears aggressive to be their foreign policy advisor, then the interaction between the variables, *Threatening Manipulation* and *Dominant Face*, should be positively related to the dependent variable: survey respondents' answers to the question, "How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor?". I control for survey respondents' age, gender, education, military service, political ideology, and country of origin. 53 observations were dropped from the data set when the respondent failed the instructional manipulation check at the end of the survey (as recommend by Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009). OLS regression results are shown in table 4.2.

The regression parameter for the interaction, *Threatening Manipulation* * *Dominant Face*, is both positive and statistically significant (although only at the .1 level), suggesting that there is indeed an upward shift in survey respondents' feelings towards an aggressive-looking foreign policy advisor when respondents have read the more threatening manipulation (table 4.2, models 1 and 2). This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 in chapter 2 and, more importantly, with the theoretical argument that leads to Hypothesis 2 in chapter 2.[43]

In order to account for the possibility that the presence of multiple manipulations in the more threatening paragraph decreases my ability to infer that variation in the level of threat (which is the crucial causal mechanism from chapter 2 that I am trying to examine) accounts for the change in respondents' feelings towards potential foreign policy advisors, I measure the extent to which survey respondents view the world as dangerous by asking the following question: "How strongly do you agree with the following statement: *There are many dangerous people in our society that will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no*

[43] *Chapter 2: Hypothesis 2*: A leader's experience has a negative effect on the likelihood of choosing foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences.

Table 4.2: OLS: How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor? (1 = Not good at all ... 5 = Extremely Good)

	Model 1	Model 2
Threatening Manipulation *binary; 1 = Respondent was selected to read the more threatening paragraph*	-0.1623 (0.230)	-0.1760 (0.232)
Dominant Face *binary; 1 = Respondent was shown a potential advisor with more aggressive facial features*	-0.1618 (0.205)	-0.1731 (0.200)
Threatening Manipulation * Dominant Face *interaction*	0.4195* (0.291)	0.3876* (0.290)
Age *in years*		-0.0055 (0.007)
Female *binary; 1 = Female*		0.1544 (0.153)
Education *1 = No education ... 4 = College degree*		0.0592 (0.219)
Military *binary; 1 = Served in the military*		-0.0979 (0.282)
Ideology *Self-reported political ideology; 1 = Left ... 10 = Right*		0.0611** (0.031)
India *binary; 0 = U.S., 1 = India*		-0.0881 (0.163)
Constant	3.7576*** (0.151)	3.3780*** (0.893)

Note: Observations: 156
One-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

reason at all." Respondents answered on a scale from 1-5, where 1 was "Not strongly at all" and 5 was "Extremely strongly." My dependent variable was constructed using respondents' answers to the following question on a scale from 1-5, where 1 was 'Not important at all," and 5 was "Extremely important:" "In general, how important is it that your advisor be aggressive?" OLS regression results are shown in table 4.3.[44] As expected, the relationship

[44]It is possible that survey respondents' beliefs in a dangerous world are affected by the manipulation involving their time in office and the level of threat. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between respondents' answers to the dangerous world question and whether or not they received the experimental manipulation.

Table 4.3: OLS: How important is it that your advisor be aggressive? (1 = Not important at all ... 5 = Extremely important)

Belief in a dangerous world *1 = Not strongly at all ... 5 = Extremely strongly*	.3097*** (.0634)
Age *in years*	-.0038 (.0056)
Female *binary; 1 = Female*	.2218* (.1359)
Military *binary; 1 = Served in the military*	.0892 (.1830)
Education *1 = No education ... 4 = College degree*	-.0005 (.1196)
Ideology *Self-reported political ideology; 1 = Left ... 10 = Right*	.0588** (.0328)
India *binary; 0 = U.S., 1 = India*	.0839 (.1522)
Constant	1.762*** (.5231)

Note: Observations: 209
One-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

between survey respondents' belief in a dangerous world and the importance that they assign to the level of aggression in their foreign policy advisors is both positive and statistically significant at the .01 level (table 4.3).

4.3.2 A Hawk for a Hawk

I gauged survey respondents' levels of risk acceptance relating to international conflict with the following question:

> "Now imagine that you are given control over your country's military and are afforded the opportunity to initiate a military conflict against another country. Your country has a very low probability of winning that conflict, but the potential

rewards from victory are enormous. How likely are you to initiate that conflict?"

Next, I asked survey respondents about the level of aggression that they would prefer in an individual making that decision for them:

> "What if you had to delegate that decision to another person? ... In general, how important is it for that decision-maker to be aggressive?"

I expected that survey respondents who were more likely to initiate high-risk, high-reward conflicts would be more likely to view aggression as an important quality in those individuals to whom they delegated conflict decisions. To that end, I ran an OLS regression using the importance that survey respondents assigned to the level of aggression in potential decision-makers as the dependent variable, measured as a discrete scale from 1-5, where 1 is not important at all and 5 is extremely important. The independent variable is the respondent's own level of risk acceptance concerning international conflict, measured as a discrete scale from 1-5, where 1 is not likely at all and 5 is extremely likely. I control for survey respondents' age, gender, education, military service, political ideology, and country of origin. OLS regression results are provided in table 4.4.

The regression parameter for survey respondents' levels of risk acceptance is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level, suggesting that more risk-acceptant individuals prefer to delegate conflict decisions to more risk-acceptant agents (table 4.4, models 1 and 2). These results provide additional support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 in chapter 3, specifically for the tendency of individuals to delegate policy decisions to agents with similar policy preferences.[45]

[45] *Chapter 3, Hypothesis 1*: A leader's hawkish foreign policy preferences have a positive effect on the probability that the leader selects a foreign minister with hawkish foreign policy preferences. *Chapter 3, Hypothesis 2*: A leader's hawkish foreign policy preferences have a positive effect on the probability that the leader selects a defense minister with hawkish foreign policy preferences.

Table 4.4: OLS: How important is it that your designated decision-maker be aggressive? (1 = Not important at all ... 5 = Extremely important)

	Model 1	Model 2
Respondent's Preference for Risky Conflicts *How likely would you be to initiate a high-risk, high-reward conflict?*	0.4122***	0.3245***
	(0.072)	(0.080)
Age *in years*		-0.0066
		(0.007)
Female *binary; 1 = Female*		0.4544***
		(0.171)
Education *1 = No education ... 4 = College degree*		-0.0732
		(0.164)
Military *binary; 1 = Served in the military*		0.1758
		(0.350)
Ideology *Self-reported political ideology; 1 = Left ... 10 = Right*		0.0702**
		(0.037)
India *binary; 0 = U.S., 1 = India*		0.2153
		(0.207)
Constant	2.1687***	2.1865***
	(0.190)	(0.750)

Note: Observations: 156
One-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the results of an original, web-based experiment conducted in the U.S. and India that provides more direct evidence of some of the causal mechanisms described throughout chapters 2 and 3. In particular, I showed that survey respondents who were manipulated into feeling threatened felt better about having an advisor who appeared aggressive. I also showed that survey respondents who were forced to delegate a conflict decision to another individual preferred to delegate that decision to an individual with similar policy preferences, more specifically that risk-acceptant survey respondents preferred to delegate conflict decisions to more risk-acceptant agents. In the next chapter, I examine

the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru in more detail in order to illustrate that my hypotheses manifest in the real world of conflict behavior, foreign policy, and cabinet formation.

CHAPTER 5

1998 NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ECUADOR AND PERU

> President Fujimori had been president of Peru for eight years and I had been president of Ecuador for four days. "You can make a first impression only once," I reminded myself.
>
> – President Jamil Mahuad of Ecuador.

There are several aspects of the 1998 negotiations between Ecuador and Peru that make them ideal for closer examination. First, the 1998 negotiations were the culmination of the oldest and longest-lasting territorial dispute in the Western Hemisphere (Palmer 1997). Second, the negotiations involved leaders who had served different amounts of time in office (including President Mahuad of Ecuador, who had been inaugurated just days before), allowing me to compare and contrast the behavior of leaders with different levels of experience. There are also a large number of interviews with the leaders of each country from around this time, giving us a clearer view into the decision-making processes of each leader. In the case of President Mahuad of Ecuador, we even have a book chapter written by the president specifically about the negotiations and cabinet formation process during this time.

The territorial disputes between Ecuador and Peru stretched back centuries, but the modern-day dispute over the territory known as the Cenepa river valley, culminating in the

negotiations of 1998, had its origins in a 1941 conflict between the two countries. In 1941, Ecuador and Peru fought a war over a much wider swath of territory, which resulted in a significant military victory by Peru. Afterwards, the two countries submitted to negotiations led by the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, and in 1942 both countries signed a peace agreement known as the *Rio Protocol*. Over time, Ecuador began to argue that the borders agreed upon as part of the *Rio Protocol* were inaccurate, due to a variety of updated geographical surveys, specifically an aerial survey which revealed that "the height of the land that was to determine the border was not where the agreement had stipulated in one small section" due to a previously unknown river and mountain spur (Palmer 1997, 113). Ecuador declared part of the *Rio Protocol* void and claimed that the territory known as the Cenepa river valley still rightfully belonged to Ecuador.

Alberto Fujimori became President of Peru in 1990 at a time of crisis. His administration was forced to confront an economic crisis in the form of out-of-control hyperinflation, and a political/military crisis in the form of a guerilla movement led by the "Shining Path." As a result of Fujimori's handling of these crises, his popularity remained sky high between the years 1992 and 1996, hovering between 60 and 80 percent (Weyland 2000). While Fujimori dealt with those crises, Ecuador had begun to deploy military units throughout the disputed territory along the Cenepa River (including the areas of Tiwintza, Base Sur, and Cueva de los Tayos), going so far as to surround their bases with land mines. Between 1991 and 1994, Peruvian troops stationed nearby paid visits to the bases to warn the Ecuadorians that they should remove the land mines and withdraw their forces from the territory. Finally, in 1995 a localized conflict broke out over the disputed territory, resulting in an ambiguous outcome in which both sides claimed victory but withdrew their troops from the valley (Palmer 1997).

After the 1995 conflict, awareness of the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru was among an all-time high among the Peruvian people. The issue had taken on an increased salience following Fujimori's successful handling of the hyperinflation of the early '90s and

the guerilla insurgency led by the "Shining Path." Given the ambiguous outcome of the 1995 conflict (with both sides claiming a military victory), as well as the increased awareness and salience of the dispute territory among the Peruvian people, there was an increasing pressure on Fujimori to achieve a more satisfying solution to the dispute. By 1998, Ecuador was experiencing its own economic crisis, and the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, had entered a strong position from which to reopen negotiations and ponder another military intervention into the disputed territory. Ecuador's newly-elected leader would be confronting not only an economic crisis, but a likely intervention by Peruvian troops into the disputed territory between the two countries.

Jamil Mahuad became President of Ecuador in August 1998. In describing the condition of the border dispute at that time, Mahuad acknowledged the weak position that the crisis had put him in for the upcoming negotiations with Peru:

> As I took office ... the Ecuadorian economy was spiraling into – arguably – its worst economic crisis of the twentieth century ... An international war would have escalated our already critical situation into a desperate one. How could Ecuador face an international war with the economy already in shambles? I needed a definitive peace accord with Peru in order to reduce the military budget, to dedicate our scarce resources to invest in social infrastructure, and to focus our attention and energies on growth and development (Mahuad 2005, 184-85).

Mahuad understood that as the leader of a democracy, one of his roles was "not so obvious but equally important ... as a negotiator with the people of Ecuador, its institutions, and representative organizations" (Mahuad 2005, 195). In other words, Mahuad knew that he was playing a two-level game, playing to audiences both at home and abroad (Putnam 1988), and that both presidents would "have the task of bringing his own constituents to accept a settlement of the boundary" (Mahuad 2005, 195).

Recall that in chapter 2 I hypothesized that inexperienced leaders – being more likely to be targeted in the absence of hawkish advisors – would be more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences. In 1998, Mahuad was certainly

inexperienced (he had just entered office!), and, in his own words, he strongly anticipated being targeted shortly after his inauguration. Mahuad purposefully selected someone as defense minister who would signal that he was being advised by more aggressive individuals and would therefore be more likely to respond aggressively to external challenges. The following is Mahuad's personal account of the selection of his defense minister:

> By the time I took office, the troops from Ecuador and Peru has occupied the previously agreed upon demilitarized zone. They faced one another so closely that, in some places, they could shake hands and say *Buenos dias* before raising their rifles. The Ecuadorian military command briefed me that Peruvian invasion starting a few hours after my inauguration was a likely scenario. Peru would most likely provoke not a localized but a generalized armed conflict ... General Jose Gallardo had been minister of defense during the most recent armed conflict in 1995; that conflict had ended with an Ecuadorian military victory. I appointed General Gallardo to be minister of defense ... This was done to send a clear signal: Although Ecuador was openly inclined to a peaceful solution, we were ready to defend ourselves fiercely if necessary. (Mahuad 2005, 187-189).

President Mahuad had reason to believe that General Gallardo in particular would serve as an effective signal. His counterpart, President Fujimori of Peru, had acknowledged years beforehand that he was familiar with General Gallardo. Referring to a failed attempt by Ecuador to take back territories from Peru, Fujimori remarked that the territories "are absolutely safe. I am sure General Gallardo would not go to Cueva de los Tayos or Base Sur to raise the Ecuadoran flag. If the Ecuadorans were in control I am sure they would report it and would do that - but they are not" (Fujimori, 1995a).

President Fujimori had also acknowledged years beforehand that he viewed the foreign minister as an important and visible actor, therefore signaling to President Mahuad that he could use the selection of foreign minister to effectively signal his own policy preferences, or, at least, the preferences of those closest to him. In 1995, Fujimori remarked: "I would like to mention ... the diplomatic success obtained by the Foreign Ministry in making Ecuador, after 35 years, sit at a negotiating table with the four guarantor countries ... in response to a

journalist's question (which I consider to be quite) probing, the Ecuadoran Foreign Minister said Ecuador recognized the validity of the protocol" (Fujimori, 1995a). During another interview around the same time, Fujimori commented on an agreement between the deputy foreign ministers of Ecuador and Peru, claiming, "this is a proposal that apparently joins together the positions of Ecuador and Peru ... naturally a proposal of this nature requires a very detailed and profound analysis, as we did on the previous occasion ... this time it will probably take less time, but in any case I hope to return tomorrow and then have the opportunity to look at it carefully" (Fujimori, 1995b).

After President Mahuad selected General Gallardo to be Minister of Defence, he received additional signs from President Fujimori that he might be able to use the signaling of aggression to achieve a more favorable outcome during negotiations. Fujimori's language during the early days of the 1998 negotiations suggests that he was warming up to idea of a diplomatic settlement, remarking, "My three goals when I started my presidency were to eliminate hyperinflation, to dismember the Shining Path guerrillas, and to finish the border issue with Ecuador. I have accomplished the first two already. The third one must be concluded as well" (Mahuad 2005, 191). This despite the fact that years beforehand, President Fujimori had stressed that he was more determined than ever to select policymakers who shared his aggressive policy preferences and stances towards the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Recall that in chapter 2 I hypothesized that inexperienced leaders – being more likely to be targeted – would be more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences, while more experienced leaders – being less likely to be targeted – would concentrate more on selecting foreign and defense ministers who maximize the likelihood with which the leader achieves their preferred policies (so hawks will tend to choose hawks, and doves will tend to choose doves). Because President Fujimori had been in office for several years prior to 1998 – as opposed to the newly inaugurated President Mahuad – I would expect Fujimori to care less about selecting ministers who lowered the

likelihood that Peru was targeted by Ecuador and more about selecting ministers who would pursue the same policies and share the same views as himself. Almost three years before the 1998 negotiations, Fujimori was commenting publicly on the congruence between his own policy preferences and those of the Peruvian military leadership, remarking that "it is the president who is in command of the armed forces and of the police. I exercise full command. I command like a true military man. I shall not allow myself to be subject to the armed forces" (Fujimori, 1995). Regarding the role of the armed forces, Fujimori added that "they should continue exercising this same role, because Peru continues to have border disputes. They must therefore continue to strengthen themselves. Throughout the past year my administration has strengthened the armed forces and it will continue to strengthen them, but for dissuasive and not for belligerent objectives" (Fujimori, 1995).

Turning back to the 1998 negotiations, President Mahuad continued to press his case aggressively and to signal that he was determined to emerge from those negotiations with a more favorable outcome for Ecuador. In his book chapter, Mahuad recalled what was going through his mind during those negotiations: "How could I communicate the seriousness of my intentions to President Fujimori without giving him the impression that I was just buying time and procrastinating?" (Mahuad 2005, 190).

Eventually President Mahuad's efforts paid off. Both leaders agreed to tie their own hands (and force themselves to accept a diplomatic solution that would be agreeable to both sides) by having a picture taken of the two of them working together on a diplomatic solution, a picture that would be published on the front pages of newspapers in both Ecuador and Peru. On taking the picture, Mahuad remarked that "we would not be looking at the camera or at each other but rather working ... The photograph would make clear that the presidents were in a collaborative effort, tackling the boundary problem together ... We had publicly undertaken that task, and we owed it to the people in each country to succeed" (Mahuad 2005, 192).

In October 1998, an agreement was reached between the Presidents of Ecuador and Peru that was quickly ratified by the legislatures in both countries. The terms of the agreement included turning the disputed territory into a conservation park in which neither country could perform economic or military activities unless previously agreed upon by both countries. Since the agreement was signed, bilateral trade between the two countries has risen, and there have been no further military confrontations between the two countries regarding the disputed territory (Mahuad 2005, 198).

In his own words, an inexperienced President Mahuad selected someone with an impressive record of military success, General Gallardo – someone who his counterpart, President Fujimori, had clearly heard of – in response to the strong likelihood of an external challenge from Peru. The more experienced President Fujimori is on record as claiming that he desired to consolidate his control over the police and military by selecting military leaders with similar aspirations and goals, especially in regards to the border dispute with Ecuador. Taken together, the firsthand accounts of Presidents Mahuad and Fujimori lend additional support to the theoretical arguments in chapters 2 and 3 (particularly chapter 2), that leaders use the selection of other individual actors in order to achieve their goals regarding international conflict, whether that means selecting foreign and defense ministers who can help an inexperienced leader avoid external challenges, or selecting foreign and defense ministers who can help an experienced leader achieve their preferred policies.

In the next chapter, I conclude the dissertation by reviewing the contributions – both theoretical and empirical – that I made in previous chapters, and I discuss where future research on both the advisor selection process and the influence of individual actors on conflict processes and foreign policy should go from here.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

What do leaders look for in potential foreign policy advisors? And to what extent do foreign policy advisors actually matter? Previous research on both of these questions has either attempted to answer one question in isolation of the other or has avoided the use of large-N quantitative methods, even though doing so has the potential to vastly increase our understanding of the initiation, escalation, and outcome of international conflict, as well as foreign policy decision-making more generally.

In this dissertation, I examine the selection of foreign policy advisors as part of a strategic decision-making process by the political leader. Using a new measure of individuals' innate foreign policy preferences based on previous research on leaders' age, military service, and gender, and using original data on the foreign and defense ministers in 164 countries between 1950 and 2000, I have shown that 1) the hawkish foreign policy preferences of the political leader, foreign minister, and defense minister have a negative effect on the likelihood that their state is targeted in an international crisis, but that this effect diminishes as the executive constraints in that state increase and the political leadership has less control over foreign policy; 2) inexperienced leaders are more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences, but this effect weakens as the leader's own hawkish foreign policy preferences increase and the leader cares less about being targeted; and 3)

all else being equal, hawkish leaders are more likely to select hawkish foreign and defense ministers, just as dovish leaders are more likely to select dovish foreign and defense ministers. This relationship weakens as the leader loses control over the selection over those ministers, specifically whenever the leader is the head of a coalition government in which the foreign affairs and defense portfolios have been awarded to a different political party.

Experimental analyses lend additional support to these findings. Survey respondents who are thrust into a hypothetical leadership position and told that there is a high probability that their country will be attacked within the next year – analogous to the increased probability that inexperienced leaders have of being targeted – experience an increase in their feelings towards an aggressive-looking advisor. In other words, individuals who feel threatened prefer to surround themselves with more aggressive-looking people in order to ward off potential adversaries. I also find that survey respondents who report a stronger preference for risky decision-making regarding international conflict and are forced to delegate those decisions to another individual prefer to delegate them to individuals with similarly risky preferences.

In chapters 2 and 3, I test my hypotheses using a rough proxy of hawkishness that was created using data on personal characteristics that previous literature has suggested affect an individuals' innate foreign policy preferences. In the future, I would like to test my hypotheses using an alternative measure of hawkish preferences based on an individual's spoken words, including prepared speeches, interviews, press conferences, etc., paying particular attention to an individual's spontaneous responses to interview questions, which are often the most revealing in regards to innate beliefs.[46]

I would like to expand upon the theoretical arguments in this dissertation by taking a more complex view of bargaining process as it relates to international conflict. For example, how do leaders', foreign ministers', and defense ministers' policy preferences affect the likeli-

[46]The organization, *Social Science Automation*, based in Columbus, OH, has developed software and coding algorithms that can analyze an individual's spoken words and generate complex psychological profiles of that individual (www.socialscience.net)

hood that the leader achieves what they want regarding international conflict at each stage of conflict? Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argue that leaders occasionally seek international conflicts in order to protect themselves from punishment – not only to protect their hold on power but to avoid meeting a grim fate after losing power. How should those scenarios affect the advisor selection process, and, more generally, how do leaders' motivations and preferences at each stage of international conflict inform the advisor selection process?

Future research should explore in more detail the determinants of individual time horizons. Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005) argue that the positive relationship between a leader's age and the probability that their state initiates militarized disputes is a function of older leaders' shortened time horizons, which lead to an increased preference for risky decision-making and hawkish foreign policy, but the authors lament that the variable for leaders' age is only a rough proxy for the concept of interest (individual time horizons). Experimental work on time horizons and foreign policy preferences could help increase our understanding of states' conflict behavior.

The literature on individual actors, conflict processes, and foreign policy could benefit from further observational and experimental work on individuals' personal characteristics, such as education, number of children, and family structure (including whether an individual was an only child, the youngest child, etc.). Scholars have already produced case studies suggesting that those characteristics can have a substantial impact upon leaders' decision-making. For example, Renshon (2003) argues that the nature of Bill Clinton's upbringing – losing his father before he was born, being abandoned by his mother between the ages of 1 and 3, and later being abused by an alcoholic step-father – had a strong impact upon Clinton's decision-making processes as President of the United States, including a strong desire for consensus among his foreign policy team. Given that the experimental analyses in this dissertation have produced results that are consistent with the theoretical expectations in chapters 2 and 3 (and in previous research on the personal characteristics of political

leaders), there is reason to believe that further experimental work on individuals' personal characteristics and policy preferences could prove fruitful in our quest to better understand the initiation, escalation, and outcome of international conflict, and foreign policy decision-making more generally.

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Personal Characteristics of Each Individual Actor

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Foreign Ministers				
Tenure	2.774	3.805	0	36
Age	51.890	9.454	16[47]	84[48]
Female	0.016	0.124	0	1
Military Service	0.192	0.394	0	1
Defense Ministers				
Tenure	3.435	5.425	0	41
Age	53.149	10.012	21	85
Female	0.003	0.057	0	1
Military Service	0.587	0.492	0	1
Political Leaders				
Tenure	6.798	7.614	0	46
Age	55.962	11.567	17	92
Female	0.017	0.129	0	1
Military Service	0.437	0.496	0	1

[47]Dominican Republic 1961: Ambrosio Alvarez Aybar.
[48]Philippines 1983: Carlos Romulo.

Table A.2: Probit Analysis of Hawkish Preferences and the Probability that the Challenging State Initiates an International Crisis Involving the Defending State (1950-2000) (Top 50% of Defending State Capabilities)

Defending State	(1)	(2)
Hawkish Preferences	-0.2354***	-0.2845***
0 = Low Hawkishness, 9 = High Hawkishness	(0.067)	(0.088)
Hawkish Preferences * Executive Constraints	0.0313*	0.0349*
interaction	(0.019)	(0.019)
Executive Constraints	-0.2175***	-0.2196***
0 = No executive constraints, 6 = Total executive constraints	(0.082)	(0.076)
Leader Tenure	0.0212**	0.0218**
Number of years that the political leader has served in that position	(0.009)	(0.010)
Foreign Minister Tenure	0.0378***	0.0335*
Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position	(0.016)	(0.021)
Defense Minister Tenure	-0.0051	-0.0019
Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position	(0.014)	(0.023)
Controls		
Relative Capabilities		-2.1321***
Defender capabilities minus Challenger capabilities		(0.695)
Joint Democracy		0.0700
dummy, 1 = Both countries have a Polity score $\geq$ 6.		(0.227)
Dyadic Trade		-0.0001*
Total volume of bilateral trade between the two countries in a dyad		(0.000)
Dyad Duration		0.0042***
Number of years that the country-dyad has been in existence		(0.001)
Peace Years		-0.0330
Number of years since the last crisis involving the two countries		(0.070)
Spline 1		0.0005
		(0.001)
Spline 2		-0.0005
		(0.001)
Spline 3		0.0002
		(0.000)
Constant	-2.2678***	-1.7986***
	(0.302)	(0.399)
Log Likelihood	-158.8649	-117.2129
Observations	28,429	20,208

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.3: Probit Analysis of Hawkish Preferences and the Probability that the Challenging State Initiates an International Crisis Involving the Defending State (1950-2000) (with each individual actor separate)

Defending State	(1)	(2)
Leader Hawkish Preferences	-0.1499**	-0.1493*
0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness	(0.074)	(0.089)
Leader Hawkish Preferences * Constraints	0.0435**	0.0407*
interaction	(0.023)	(0.031)
Foreign Minister Hawkish Preferences	-0.3086***	-0.2742**
0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness	(0.109)	(0.119)
Foreign Minister Hawkish Preferences * Constraints	0.0665***	0.0721**
interaction	(0.024)	(0.029)
Defense Minister Hawkish Preferences	0.0067	0.0947
0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness	(0.080)	(0.123)
Defense Minister Hawkish Preferences * Constraints	-0.0019	-0.0552*
interaction	(0.021)	(0.036)
Executive Constraints	-0.1832***	-0.1462***
0 = No executive constraints, 6 = Total executive constraints	(0.035)	(0.046)
Leader Tenure	0.0025	0.0009
Number of years that the leader has served in that position	(0.005)	(0.005)
Foreign Minister Tenure	-0.0007	0.0066
Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position	(0.008)	(0.009)
Defense Minister Tenure	0.0131*	0.0087
Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position	(0.007)	(0.008)
Controls		
Relative Capabilities		-1.4810***
Defender capabilities minus Challenger capabilities		(0.382)
Joint Democracy		-0.3372**
dummy, 1 = Both countries have a Polity score $\geq$ 6.		(0.174)
Dyadic Trade		-0.0001*
Total volume of bilateral trade between the two countries in a dyad		(0.000)
Dyad Duration		0.0022**
Number of years that the country-dyad has been in existence		(0.001)
Peace Years		-0.1952***
Number of years since the last crisis involving the two countries		(0.035)
Constant	-2.2197***	-1.4084***
	(0.117)	(0.193)
Log Likelihood	-646.8316	-415.0043
Observations	38,256	28,927

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Results for peace years splines have been omitted to preserve space.

Table A.4: Logit Analysis of Hawkish Preferences and the Probability that the Challenging State Initiates an International Crisis Involving the Defending State (1950-2000)

Defending State	(1)	(2)
Hawkish Preferences	-0.3923***	-0.3115***
0 = Low Hawkishness, 9 = High Hawkishness	(0.070)	(0.112)
Hawkish Preferences * Constraints	0.1023***	0.0615*
interaction	(0.026)	(0.032)
Executive Constraints	-0.5870***	-0.4630***
0 = No executive constraints, 6 = Total executive constraints	(0.102)	(0.130)
Leader Tenure	0.0071	0.0041
Number of years that the leader has served in that position	(0.013)	(0.016)
Foreign Minister Tenure	-0.0131	-0.0007
Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position	(0.020)	(0.022)
Defense Minister Tenure	0.0458***	0.0308
Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position	(0.015)	(0.019)
Controls		
Relative Capabilities		-3.4372***
Defender capabilities minus Challenger capabilities		(1.014)
Joint Democracy		-1.0686**
dummy, 1 = Both countries have a Polity score $\geq$ 6.		(0.520)
Dyadic Trade		-0.0001*
Total volume of bilateral trade between the two countries in a dyad		(0.000)
Dyad Duration		0.0063**
Number of years that the country-dyad has been in existence		(0.003)
Peace Years		-0.5433***
Number of years since the last crisis involving the two countries		(0.085)
Spline 1		-0.0037***
		(0.001)
Spline 2		0.0019**
		(0.001)
Spline 3		-0.0004
		(0.001)
Constant	-4.0736***	-1.9064***
	(0.307)	(0.465)
Log Likelihood	-649.8278	-418.0024
Observations	38,256	28,927

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.5: Ordered Logit Analysis of Leaders' Tenure and the Hawkish Preferences of Their Foreign and Defense Ministers

	(1)	(2)
Leader Tenure	-.0226***	-.0674***
Number of years that the political leader has served in that position	(.0066)	(.0123)
Leader Tenure * Leader Hawkish Preferences		.0321***
interaction		(.0075)
Leader Hawkish Preferences	.6894***	.4994***
0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness	(.0655)	(.0858)
Foreign Minister Tenure	.0584***	.0623***
Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position	(.0116)	(.0118)
Defense Minister Tenure	.0131*	.0118*
Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position	(.0071)	(.0071)
Winning Coalition Size	-.8270***	-.8677***
0 = Small winning coalition, 1 = Large winning coalition	(.1489)	(.1504)
Major Power	1.938***	1.960***
dummy, 1 = The leader's country is a major power	(.1485)	(.1485)
Cut Point 1	-1.065	-1.302
	(.1374)	(.1525)
Cut Point 2	.7277	.4983
	(.1372)	(.1511)
Cut Point 3	2.539	2.325
	(.1478)	(.1592)
Cut Point 4	4.504	4.297
	(.1838)	(.1921)

Note: Observations: 2,179

Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.6: Ordered Probit Analysis of Leaders' Tenure and the Hawkish Preferences of Their Foreign and Defense Ministers (with each minister separate)

	Foreign Minister	Defense Minister
Leader Tenure	-.0434***	-.0357***
Number of years that the political leader has served in that position	(.0065)	(.0076)
Leader Tenure * Leader Hawkish Preferences	.0100**	.0257***
interaction	(.0042)	(.0048)
Leader Hawkish Preferences	.3793***	.1465***
0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness	(.0402)	(.0477)
Foreign Minister Tenure	.0546***	
Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position	(.0046)	
Defense Minister Tenure		.0322***
Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position		(.0048)
Winning Coalition Size	.1960***	-.9517***
0 = Small winning coalition, 1 = Large winning coalition	(.0648)	(.0833)
Major Power	.9514***	.6977***
dummy, 1 = The leader's country is a major power	(.0782)	(.0904)
Cut Point 1	.7960	-.8944
	(.0631)	(.0814)
Cut Point 2	2.075	.7302
	(.0671)	(.0812)
Observations	4167	2492

Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.7: Ordered Probit Analysis of Leaders' Tenure and the Hawkish Preferences of Their Foreign and Defense Ministers (with the dependent variable, *Ministers' Hawkish Preferences*, disaggregated into individual personal characteristics... *Ministers' Age*, etc.)

D.V.	Age	Military Service	Female
Leader Tenure	-0.0452***	-0.0113**	-0.0019
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.011)
Leader Tenure * Leader Age	0.0403***		
	(0.009)		
Leader Tenure * Leader Military		-0.0067	
		(0.006)	
Leader Tenure * Leader Female			-0.0004
			(0.017)
Leader Age	0.3420***	0.2318***	-0.3362**
	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.144)
Leader Military	0.0862*	0.6301***	-0.0620
	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.166)
Leader Female	0.5824***	0.4148**	-6.3544***
	(0.184)	(0.188)	(0.107)
Foreign Minister Tenure	0.0386***	0.0121**	-0.0371
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.027)
Defense Minister Tenure	0.0026	0.0106**	-0.0668**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.027)
Winning Coalition Size	0.1465	-0.8233***	1.0611***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.289)
Major Power	0.4737***	1.0832***	-0.5928*
	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.372)
Cut Point 1	0.5641***	-0.5328***	2.6242***
	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.283)
Cut Point 2	1.6546***	1.0689***	3.5572***
	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.283)
Log Likelihood	-2143.066	-2089.8385	-189.9117
Observations	2437	2327	2775

Two-tailed test: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Countries Included in the European Representative Democracy (ERD) Data Set

Austria	Luxembourg	Estonia
Belgium	The Netherlands	Hungary
Denmark	Norway	Latvia
Finland	Portugal	Lithuania
France	Spain	Malta
Germany	Sweden	Poland
Greece	United Kingdom	Romania
Iceland	Bulgaria	Slovakia
Ireland	Cyprus	Slovenia
Italy	Czech Republic	

Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables on Individual Actors Used to Generate the Results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Foreign Ministers				
Tenure	2.237	3.515	0	20
Age	53.690	8.592	28	78
Female	0.028	0.1657	0	1
Military Service	0.1903	0.3931	0	1
Defense Ministers				
Tenure	1.173	2.013	0	13
Age	50.997	7.692	32	70
Female	0.0115	0.1066	0	1
Military Service	0.3087	0.4627	0	1
Political Leaders				
Tenure	3.231	4.339	0	23
Age	57.457	10.216	32	86
Female	0.0190	0.1368	0	1
Military Service	0.2916	0.4551	0	1

Table A.10: Ordered Logit Analysis of the Hawkish Preferences of The Foreign Minister (1950-2000)

	(1)	(2)
Leader Hawkish Preferences	0.4008**	-0.0195
0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness	(0.152)	(0.268)
Leader Hawkish Preferences * Foreign Affairs Portfolio		0.5574*
interaction		(0.320)
Foreign Affairs Portfolio		0.2574
dummy; 1 = The foreign affairs portfolio was awarded to the leader's party		(0.332)
Leader Tenure	-0.0543	-0.0658**
Number of years that the political leader has served in that position	(0.029)	(0.032)
Foreign Minister Tenure	0.1563***	0.1978***
Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position	(0.031)	(0.034)
Cabinet Control		-3.28e-06
0 = Prime Minister has Little Control, 7 = Significant Control		(1.35e-05)
Post-Election		0.3237
dummy, 1 = The government was formed immediately following an election		(0.253)
Coalition Government		2.09e-05*
dummy, 1 = The government includes multiple political parties		(8.85e-06)
Number of Parties		7.90e-06
The number of parties included in the government		(2.10e-05)
Number of Ministers		0.1495***
The number of individuals serving as cabinet members		(0.027)
Cut 1	0.9606***	4.1383***
	(0.170)	(0.642)
Cut 2	3.0379***	6.4942***
	(0.254)	(0.715)
Log-likelihood	-290.6119	-258.5677
Observations	355	342

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.11: Ordered Logit Analysis of the Hawkish Preferences of The Defense Minister (1950-2000)

	(1)	(2)
Leader Hawkish Preferences *0 = Low Hawkishness, 3 = High Hawkishness*	0.7721***	0.8754***
	(0.159)	(0.280)
Leader Hawkish Preferences * Defense Portfolio *interaction*		-0.0977
		(0.321)
Defense Portfolio *dummy; 1 = The defense portfolio was awarded to the leader's party*		-0.0136
		(0.385)
Leader Tenure *Number of years that the political leader has served in that position*	-0.0940***	-0.1075***
	(0.030)	(0.033)
Defense Minister Tenure *Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position*	0.1544***	0.1342**
	(0.058)	(0.060)
Cabinet Control *0 = Prime Minister has Little Control, 7 = Significant Control*		-0.0001
		(0.001)
Post-Election *dummy, 1 = The government was formed immediately following an election*		-0.0652
		(0.247)
Coalition Government *dummy, 1 = The government includes multiple political parties*		1.37e-05*
		(9.41e-06)
Number of Parties *The number of parties included in the government*		-0.1735*
		(0.108)
Number of Ministers *The number of individuals serving as cabinet members*		0.0164
		(0.026)
Cut 1	0.8727***	0.7117
	(0.170)	(0.651)
Cut 2	4.0309***	3.9442***
	(0.351)	(0.725)
Log-likelihood	-256.4249	-240.0333
Observations	349	338

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.12: Probit Analysis of Leaders' Age and the Age of Their Foreign and Defense Ministers, 1950-2000

D.V.	F.M. Age	D.M. Age
Leader Age *Age of the political leader (in years)*	-0.0502 (0.1763)	0.7410*** (0.1822)
Leader Tenure *Number of years that the political leader has served in that position*	-0.0123 (0.0194)	-0.0638*** (0.0204)
Foreign Minister Tenure *Number of years that the foreign minister has served in that position*	0.1166*** (0.0209)	
Defense Minister Tenure *Number of years that the defense minister has served in that position*		0.0652* (0.0404)
Constant	-.9251*** (.1089)	-1.290*** (.1358)
Observations	355	340

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.13: Probit Analysis of Leaders' Military Service and the Military Service of Their Foreign and Defense Ministers, 1950-2000

D.V.	F.M. Military Service	D.M. Military Service
Leader Military Service *dummy, 1 = The leader served in the military*	0.7407*** (0.1625)	0.2107 (0.1650)
Constant	-1.145*** (.1024)	-.5566*** (.0886)
Observations	351	310

Note: Two-tailed test: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

APPENDIX B

FULL QUESTIONNAIRE

Full Questionnaire: "Risk Acceptance, Foreign Policy Preferences, and the Delegating of Foreign Policy Decisions"

[Subjects were randomly assigned to read paragraph one or two]

One: "Imagine that you are the [President / Prime Minister] of [the United States / India]. You have been in office for 7 years and have developed a strong reputation as a competent leader. Even if [the United States / India] were targeted with a destructive attack within the next 12 months, it would not have a significant effect on your approval ratings because of your established reputation. Moreover, the probability that [the U.S. / India] will be targeted with a destructive attack within the next 12 months is very low. You can select one person to advise you on how to respond to potential threats and to accompany you to negotiations with any countries that are considering attacking your country. Below are descriptions of two potential advisors."

Two: "Imagine that you have recently been inaugurated as [President / Prime Minister] of [the United States / India] and are therefore in charge of responding to potential military threats against [the U.S. / India]. There is a high probability that [the U.S. / India] will be attacked within the next 12 months. This attack is likely to be very destructive and result in the deaths of over one thousand [U.S. / Indian] citizens. Unfortunately, you have not yet established a strong reputation, and your approval ratings are likely to drop precipitously if your country is targeted with a destructive attack. You can select one person to advise you on how to respond to potential threats and to accompany you to negotiations with any countries that are considering attacking your country. Below are descriptions of two potential advisors"

[*Next, the respondent was shown two descriptions of potential advisors (A or B), each with a randomized age, gender, and level of military service. The respondent was asked to choose between A and B.*]

[Follow-up questions]

How strongly do you prefer your chosen advisor over the alternative?
<1> Not strongly at all
<2> Not too strongly
<3> Somewhat strongly
<4> Very strongly
<5> Extremely strongly

How upset would you be if you could not have your preferred advisor?
<1> Not upset at all
<2> Not too upset
<3> Somewhat upset
<4> Very upset
<5> Extremely upset

How confident are you that you made the best choice?
<1> Not confident at all
<2> Not too confident
<3> Somewhat confident
<4> Very confident
<5> Extremely confident

[*Next, the respondent was shown a computer-generated male face. Subjects are randomly assigned to see faces with different levels of dominant facial features. All subjects saw the same description below the randomized face, so that the only variable being manipulated was the level of dominant facial features in the face.*] "This man served as a foreign policy advisor to three different [Presidents / Prime Ministers]. Before entering government, he also served in the armed forces, earning two medals for bravery and valor."

How would you feel about having this person as your foreign policy advisor?
<1> Not good at all
<2> Not too good
<3> Somewhat good
<4> Very good
<5> Extremely good

In general, how important is it that your advisor be aggressive?

<1> Not important at all
<2> Not too important
<3> Somewhat important
<4> Very important
<5> Extremely important

How important is it that your advisor have experience responding to military threats?

<1> Not confident at all
<2> Not too confident
<3> Somewhat confident
<4> Very confident
<5> Extremely confident

Now imagine that you are given control over your country's military and are afforded the opportunity to initiate a military conflict against another country. Your country has a very low probability of winning that conflict, but the potential rewards from victory are enormous. How likely are you to initiate that conflict?

<1> Not likely at all
<2> Not too likely
<3> Somewhat likely
<4> Very likely
<5> Extremely likely

What if you had to delegate that decision to another person? Which of the following people would you rather have making the decision on whether or not to initiate that conflict?

[*The respondent is shown descriptions of two potential decision-makers (A and B), each with a randomized age, gender, and level of military service. The respondent is asked to choose between A and B.*]

[Follow-up questions]

How strongly do you prefer your chosen decision-maker over the alternative?

<1> Not strongly at all
<2> Not too strongly
<3> Somewhat strongly
<4> Very strongly
<5> Extremely strongly

In general, how important is it for that decision-maker to be aggressive?
<1> Not important at all
<2> Not too important
<3> Somewhat important
<4> Very important
<5> Extremely important

How important is it for that decision-maker to have experience making the decision to use military force?
<1> Not confident at all
<2> Not too confident
<3> Somewhat confident
<4> Very confident
<5> Extremely confident

How old are you?
<blank>

What is your gender?
<1> Male
<2> Female

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
<1> No education
<2> Primary education
<3> Secondary education (high school)
<4> University degree
<5> Don't know

Which of the following options would you prefer?
<1> A sure loss of $890
<2> A 90 percent chance to lose $1,000 and a 10 percent chance to lose nothing.

For U.S. respondents... In general, do you think of yourself as a...
<1> Democrat
<2> Republican
<3> Independent
<4> Other

Have you ever served in your country's military?
<1> Yes
<2> No

If the subject answers yes to the previous question:

Did you experience combat while serving in your country's military?
<1> Yes
<2> No

How strongly do you agree with the following statement: "There are many dangerous people in our society that will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all."
<1> Not strongly at all
<2> Not too strongly
<3> Somewhat strongly
<4> Very strongly
<5> Extremely strongly

Do you have any friends or family currently serving in your country's military?
<1> Yes
<2> No

How many children do you have?
<blank>

In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

Left _____ Right
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

For U.S. respondents... Most modern theories of decision making recognize the fact that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables, can greatly impact the decision process. In order to facilitate our research on decision making we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions. So, rather than answering the following question accurately, please check only Glenn Anderson and then continue. This will demonstrate to us that you have taken the time to read and follow the instructions.

Which of the following politicians have you heard mentioned in the news in the last week? (Please check all that apply.)

<1> Barack Obama
<2> Mitt Romney
<3> Newt Gingrich
<4> Rick Santorum
<5> Rick Scott
<6> Paul Ryan
<7> Bobby Jindal
<8> Glenn Anderson
<9> None of the above

For Indian respondents... Most modern theories of decision making recognize the fact that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables, can greatly impact the decision process. In order to facilitate our research on decision making we are interested in knowing certain factors about you, the decision maker. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then some of our questions that rely on changes in the instructions will be ineffective. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please do not accurately answer the next question and instead check only croquet, regardless of what might be true for you.

Which of the following sports have you watched on television in the last week? (Please check all that apply.)

<1> Skiing
<2> Soccer
<3> Snowboarding
<4> Tennis
<5> Football
<6> Volleyball
<7> Croquet
<8> Basketball
<9> None of the above

APPENDIX C
IRB APPROVAL FORM

Florida State UNIVERSITY

Office of the Vice President For Research
Human Subjects Committee

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM (for change in research protocol)

Date: 10/15/2012

To: Jacob Ausderan

Address:

Dept: POLITICAL SCIENCE

From: Thomas L. Jacobson, Chair

Re: Use of Human subjects in Research
Project entitled: International Conflict and the Strategic Selection of Foreign Policy Advisors

The application that you submitted to this office in regard to the requested change/amendment to your research protocol for the above-referenced project has been reviewed and approved.

Please be reminded that if the project has not been completed by 06/14/2013 , you must request renewed approval for continuation of the project.

By copy of this memorandum, the chairman of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protection. The Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: Jennifer Jerit
HSC NO. 2012.9230

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE CONSENT FORM

Consent Form

We would like to ask you some questions about your views on foreign policy and war. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and confidential, to the extent allowed by law. Researchers will have no access to your identity. There are no health or safety risks associated with the study except the normal level of risk associated with sitting at a computer.

Please read the information carefully and choose the response that best matches your opinion. You are free to withdraw from the survey at any time, but the survey must be completed in order to receive compensation. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete.

You can obtain more information about the study by contacting Jacob Ausderan (foreignpolicysurvey@gmail.com; 850-644-5727). If you have any questions about your rights as a human subject, you may contact the FSU human subjects office at 850-644-7900.

If you consent and wish to participate in this study, click "YES" to continues.

YES NO

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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